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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS ON CORPORATE REPUTATION: 
ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
by 
Mohammad Abrahim Soleimani 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor William Newburry, Major Professor 
This dissertation studied the determinants and consequences of corporate reputation. It 
explored how firm-, industry-, and country-level factors influence the general public’s 
assessment of a firm’s reputation and how this reputation assessment impacted the firm’s 
strategic actions and organizational outcomes. The three empirical essays are grounded 
on separate theoretical paradigms in strategy, organizational theory, and corporate 
governance. The first essay used signaling theory to investigate firm-, industry-, and 
country-level determinants of individual-level corporate reputation assessments. Using a 
hierarchical linear model, it tested the theory based on individual evaluations of the 
largest companies across countries. Results indicated that variables at multiple analysis 
levels simultaneously impact individual level reputation assessments. Interactions were 
also found between industry- and country-level factors. Results confirmed the multi-level 
nature of signaling influences on reputation assessments.  
 Building on a stakeholder-power approach to corporate governance, the second 
essay studied how differences in the power and preferences of three stakeholder groups – 
shareholders, creditors, and workers – across countries influence the general public’s 
vii 
reputation assessments of corporations. Examining the largest companies across countries, 
the study found that while the influence of stock market return is stronger in societies 
where shareholders have more power, social performance has a more significant role in 
shaping reputation evaluations in societies with stronger labor rights. Unexpectedly, 
when creditors have greater power, the influence of financial stability on reputation 
assessment becomes weaker.  
 Exploring the consequences of reputation, the third essay investigated the specific 
effects of intangible assets on strategic actions and organizational outcomes. Particularly, 
it individually studied the impacts of acquirer acquisition experience, corporate 
reputation, and approach toward social responsibilities as well as their combined effect 
on market reactions to acquisition announcements. Using an event study of acquisition 
announcements, it confirmed the significant impacts of both action-specific (acquisition 
experience) and general (reputation and social performance) intangible assets on market 
expectations of acquisition outcomes. Moreover, the analysis demonstrated that 
reputation magnifies the impact of acquisition experience on market response to 
acquisition announcements. In conclusion, this dissertation tried to advance and extend 
the application of management and organizational theories by explaining the mechanisms 
underlying antecedents and consequences of corporate reputation. 
 
 
  
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER PAGE 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 
II. ESSAY 1: MULTI-LEVEL SIGNALING IMPACTS ON INDIVIDUAL 
CORPORATE REPUTATION ASSESSMENTS ................................................. 10 
Introduction ............................................................................................................ 10 
Literature Review ................................................................................................... 12 
Corporate Reputation ....................................................................................... 12 
Signaling Theory .............................................................................................. 16 
Hypotheses Development ....................................................................................... 19 
Firm-level Hypotheses ..................................................................................... 19 
Industry-level Hypotheses. ............................................................................... 22 
Country-level Hypotheses ................................................................................ 25 
Methodology .......................................................................................................... 30 
Sample .............................................................................................................. 30 
Dependent Variable .......................................................................................... 31 
Independent Variables ...................................................................................... 31 
Control Variables ............................................................................................. 33 
Analysis ............................................................................................................ 33 
Results .................................................................................................................... 34 
Discussion and Conclusions ................................................................................... 40 
III. ESSAY 2:  THE IMPACT OF STAKEHOLDER POWER ON CORPORATE 
REPUTATION: A CROSS-COUNTRY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PERSPECTIVE ...................................................................................................... 48 
Introduction ............................................................................................................ 48 
Literature Review ................................................................................................... 51 
Corporate Reputation ....................................................................................... 51 
Corporate Governance ...................................................................................... 53 
Stakeholder Power, Corporate Reputation and the Corporate Objective Function 57 
Financial and Social Performance .................................................................... 58 
Stakeholder Power ............................................................................................ 62 
Methods .................................................................................................................. 66 
Setting and Data ............................................................................................... 66 
Dependent Variable .......................................................................................... 67 
Independent Variables ...................................................................................... 68 
Control Variables ............................................................................................. 71 
ix 
Estimation Method ........................................................................................... 71 
Results .................................................................................................................... 72 
Discussion and Conclusions ................................................................................... 76 
IV. ESSAY 3: NO SUBSTITUTE FOR EXPERIENCE? THE IMPACT OF 
CORPORATE REPUTATION ON STOCK MARKET REACTIONS TO 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS ...................................................................... 82 
Introduction ............................................................................................................ 82 
Literature Review ................................................................................................... 84 
Mergers and Acquisitions ................................................................................. 84 
Corporate Reputation and Consequences ......................................................... 90 
Hypotheses Development ....................................................................................... 95 
Acquisition Experience .................................................................................... 96 
Corporate Reputation ....................................................................................... 99 
Impact of Acquirer’s Reputation on its Acquisition Experience ................... 102 
Acquirer’s Social Responsibility Approach ................................................... 105 
Methods ................................................................................................................ 107 
Sample ............................................................................................................ 107 
Dependent Variable ........................................................................................ 108 
Independent Variables .................................................................................... 108 
Control Variables ........................................................................................... 110 
Results .................................................................................................................. 111 
Discussion and Conclusions ................................................................................. 116 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 123 
VITA ............................................................................................................................... 143 
 
 
 
  
x 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE PAGE 
1. TABLE 1.1: Individual-level Variables: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.......34 
2. TABLE 1.2: Firm-level Variables: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations............…34 
3. TABLE 1.3: Country-level Variables: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations…..…34 
4. TABLE 1.4: Regression Analysis Predicting Corporate Reputation Perception.....…38 
5. TABLE 1.5: Regression Analysis Predicting Corporate Reputation Perception….…39 
6. TABLE 2.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations………………………….……73 
7. TABLE 2.2: Tobit Regression Results for Corporate Reputation…………………75 
8. TABLE 3.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations………………………….……112 
9. TABLE 3.2: Regression Results for Market Reaction to M&A Announcements….113 
 
 
 
 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate reputation is a collective perception of stakeholders of a firm (Fombrun, 
1996) and an intangible asset which can be a source of competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991). The Resource-based View (RBV) proposes that rare, socially complex, and 
difficult to imitate intangible assets significantly contribute to performance differences 
among organizations (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Rao, 
1994). Firms place a high priority on building a favorable reputation, and they deploy 
significant resources towards this purpose. In academia, corporate reputation attracts 
attention of scholars from different disciplines such as economics, accounting, finance, 
sociology, management, strategy, and marketing (Gotsi & Wilson, 2001). Two areas in 
which scholars have concentrated their attention are the antecedents (determinants) and 
consequences of corporate reputation. 
Although extensive research has investigated the antecedents of corporate 
reputation, relatively few works have studied its industry- and country-level determinants. 
In addition to the need for simultaneously investigating the effects of industry- and 
country-level factors, it is important to pay attention to the interdependence of these 
levels. Most prior reputation research does not account for the interdependence of 
individual-level data being nested within higher levels of observation, which could 
significantly influence past results (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, & du Toit, 
2004). Besides their direct effects on reputation, firm-level determinants are influenced 
by industry-level characteristics which are dependent on country-level factors. Reputation 
literature, which has primarily focused its analysis at the firm-level, implicitly assumes 
determinants of reputation are universal (see Love & Kraatz, 2009). The impact of 
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national institutional, legal/political, and cultural differences that influence the way the 
general public evaluates corporate reputation has received comparatively less attention 
and is not fully understood (Gardberg, 2006). In a comparative research, Aperia, Simcic-
Bronn, and Schultz (2004) studied perceptions of corporate reputation across 
Scandinavian countries which are often considered very similar and found surprising 
differences among them. Their findings confirms that national institutions influence 
widely-held beliefs about the role of the business corporation in society and people use 
these expectations as criteria to evaluate corporate reputations (Chen, Newburry, & Park, 
2009; Deephouse, Li, & Newburry, 2009; Schneper & Guillén, 2004). 
In addition to studying the determinants of reputation, scholars showed interests 
in investigating the consequences of reputation. However, despite a large body of 
research in this area, most prior studies focused on the general consequences of 
reputation such as overall firm performance, customer loyalty, and supportive behavior 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Newburry, 2010; Walsh et al, 2009) and little research has 
examined the instrumentality of corporate reputation in determining corporate strategic 
actions. More specifically, the literature is limited in its coverage of the impacts of 
reputation on specific corporate actions. Furthermore, focusing on a specific 
organizational action allows researchers to compare the influence of reputation with other 
intangible assets as well as to investigate their joint effects on the organizational action. 
In order to fill these theoretical gaps, this dissertation presents three empirical 
essays to investigate the multi-level determinants of corporate reputation, explain 
differences among reputed companies across countries, and examine the impact of 
reputation on an organizational action. While the focus of all three essays is on corporate 
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reputation, each of them approaches reputation from a unique perspective, is grounded in 
a different theoretical paradigm, and applies a distinct empirical method. 
The first essay, using signaling theory, sets out to investigate the effects of 
corporate reputation determinants at different levels, including firm-level signals, 
industry differences, and country-level signals in forming the general public’s 
perceptions of firms. At the firm level, it studies the effects of financial performance, 
social performance, and firm size. Financial performance, social performance, and firm 
size are separating signals that a firm can send to its audiences to distinguish itself from 
its counterparts. By lowering information uncertainty between a firm and the general 
public, these signals help the firm gain trust, respect, and admiration among its 
constituents and consequently form a favorable reputation assessment. At the industry 
level, industries are differentiated based on their output (manufacturing vs. service), 
customer (B2B vs. B2C), and reputation (controversial vs. non-controversial). It is argued 
that general public opinion depends on information availability. Therefore, it is expected 
that the public evaluates firms lower in industries with higher information uncertainty. At 
the country-level, direct effects of three aspects of country development including 
economic, institutional, and human development on corporate reputation are analyzed. 
Information uncertainty is lower in more developed countries due to more information 
dissemination channels, higher information disclosure standards, and a more educated 
and information seeking public. As a result, the general public in more developed 
countries is more informed about their focal firms and industries and consequently 
evaluates them better.  
The result of analyses including firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants 
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of reputation confirmed the significant influence of social performance on public 
assessments about corporate reputation. In addition, it showed that although the general 
public has lower evaluations about companies in service, B2B, and controversial 
industries, in more advanced countries, these evaluations are less negative for companies 
in service and B2B industries and more negative for those in controversial industries. 
Interestingly, the results reported that country development has a significant impact on 
the general public’s perception about its focal companies but not in the expected direction. 
In other words, people in more developed countries have less favorable opinions about 
companies in their countries.  
This essay contributes to the corporate reputation literature in two ways. 
Theoretically, there is a lack of studies analyzing industry- and country-level antecedents 
of corporate reputations, and this study helps overcome this limitation by finding 
significant industry- and country-level effects, in addition to more commonly studied 
firm-level variables. Methodologically, the first essay recognizes the interdependence 
among the variables at different analysis levels and captures more accurate effects of 
higher level variables on the criterion variable by using multi-level analysis techniques. 
Following interesting country-level results in Essay 1, the second essay studies 
how national institutions influence the general public’s assessment of the reputations of 
corporations. Inspired by comparative corporate governance studies, this study 
investigates which companies gain higher reputation in a society by analyzing the 
distribution of power in that society. Corporations can be described as a nexus of 
contracts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which is a collection of contracts between different 
stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, managers, employees, banks, and government). 
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Stakeholders have different interests in the corporation and compete for limited resources 
of the firm (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Therefore, corporations can be viewed as place 
for political contest (Fligstein, 2001; Ocasio, 1994; Perrow, 1986) among stakeholders. 
The stakeholder with more power wins the contest and determines the role of 
corporations in a society. A stakeholder’s power originates in a country’s institutional 
and legal systems (Schneper & Guillen, 2004). In other words, the stakeholder which a 
country’s institutions favor is more powerful than other stakeholders, and therefore will 
be the winner of a political contest among stakeholders, and consequently have a stronger 
influence in determining the role of corporations in a society. As a result of defined roles 
of corporations in society (Chen, Newburry & Park, 2009), the worldview and 
expectations of the people in the society regarding corporations will be formed and will 
be used as a base for interpreting companies’ behaviors (Fligstein, 1996). People use 
these expectations as criteria to evaluate corporate reputations. Accordingly, depending 
on differences in institutions across countries, firms with more favorable reputations vary 
from country to country.  
To investigate which companies have more favorable reputations across countries 
and the reasons behind their superior reputations, this essay, in the first step, examines 
the direct impacts of firms’ financial performance (via stock market returns and financial 
performance stability) and social performance on reputation evaluations within society in 
order to disentangle the multiple impacts of firm performance on reputation. These firm 
attributes are valued by a broad range of constituencies across countries. Most 
stakeholder groups tend to favor firms that are financially vigorous and act responsibly, 
even if they place a different priority on each of these objectives. In the second step, the 
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essay studies the comparative importance of financial and social performance to 
reputation assessment, which depends on the allocation of power and legal rights within 
society. In particular, the essay examines variation in the protection of rights of 
shareholders, creditors, and labor. These are the most frequently cited stakeholders for 
their varying levels of influence across countries. These stakeholders have a 
comparatively direct claim on the firm’s resources as a result of their invested stake in the 
firm (see Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997; Schneper & Guillén, 2004) across countries, 
which influences general public assessment of corporate reputation and the determination 
of reputed companies. Results of the analysis reported significant impacts of stock market 
return, financial stability, and social performance on public evaluation of corporation 
reputation. Moreover, results confirmed that variation in reputed companies across 
countries can be explained based on the powerful stakeholders in that society.  
The second essay contributes to several streams of research. First, this paper is 
among the few studies that examine corporate reputation in a wide range of countries 
from both developed and developing economies and therefore generates important new 
insights into how national institutional differences affect the performance-reputation 
relationship. Second, this study contributes to the field of corporate governance by 
extending the relevance of this literature to a new study domain, the area of corporate 
reputation. The second essay reaffirms the utility of conceptualizing national corporate 
governance systems by stakeholder influence. Countries must not be segregated too 
quickly into dichotomies or other simplified categorization schemes (e.g., shareholder- 
versus stakeholder-centered models). The analysis underscores how the use of more fine-
grained measures of stakeholder power can produce more nuanced insights. Third, this 
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research contributes to the debate on convergence and the global diffusion of business 
practices (Davis & Marquis, 2005; Guillén, 2001; Weber, Davis & Lounsbury, 2009). 
Corporate governance and other practices are unlikely to converge in the foreseeable 
future since the very concept of the firm differs significantly across countries. Finally, 
this study examines reputation using a measure based on the assessments of the general 
population of a country. This differs significantly from studies that examine measures 
based on a specific segment of elite evaluators, such as financial analysts. By taking this 
approach, the study is able to better capture the effects of stakeholder power on society.  
The third essay investigates the effects of three intangible assets – corporate 
reputation, acquisition experience, and business approach toward societal responsibilities 
– on market reaction to acquisition announcements. It examines the nature of the 
relationship between these three intangible assets, individually and combined, and market 
expectation of acquisition success. In particular, an acquirer’s reputation signals the 
acquirer’s capability in integrating the target company and creating synergy out of an 
acquisition. On the other hand, past acquisition experience of an acquirer is not simply 
transferable and applicable to future acquisitions since acquisition experience is context-
dependent and cannot be applied to dissimilar situations without enough knowledge and 
expertise. In practice, due to the complexity and heterogeneity of acquisitions, novice 
acquirers with limited acquisition experience are not capable of realizing the underlying 
factors impacting acquisitions and differences across acquisitions, and therefore make 
inappropriate generalizations of their past acquisition experience (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). However, expert acquirers with extended numbers of past acquisitions 
can benefit from their expertise and in-depth knowledge. Therefore, it is expected that 
8 
acquisition experience and market reaction to acquisition announcement will have a U-
shaped relationship. Furthermore, reputation magnifies the U-shaped relation between 
acquisition experience and market reaction by making an acquirer more visible, bringing 
organizational actors and media praise, and enhancing an acquirer’s responsibility to 
maintain its favorable reputation. This essay also studies the impact of an acquirer’s 
approach toward social responsibility on market expectation about the future of the 
acquisition. Due to failure of the majority of acquisitions, the market is very conservative 
in evaluating the future outcome of an acquisition attempt. Accordingly, companies with 
good social performance which are expected to behave consistently with societal norms 
and values are less likely to adopt strategies such as lay-offs that are legitimate, but not 
socially-favorable. Therefore, the market has lower confidence in socially responsible 
acquirers to create value out of acquisition announcements. While results supported the 
U-shaped relationship between acquisition experience and market reaction and the 
magnifying impact of reputation on the U-shaped relationship, they did not show a 
positive, but rather a significant negative impact of reputation on market reaction. Also, 
they confirmed the negative effect of superior social performance on market expectation 
about the future of on acquisition. Overall, the third essay compares the impact of 
reputation, which is a general intangible asset, with acquisition experience, which is an 
action-specific intangible asset, on a specific strategic action, in this case acquisition 
strategy. Accordingly, this study investigates the generalizability of corporate reputation 
by testing its impacts on a specific organizational practice. 
This study contributes to the strategy literature and advances our understanding of 
intangible assets in four ways. First, confirming the RBV perspective (Amit & 
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Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991), this paper empirically shows that both action-specific 
factual and general perceptual intangible assets have a significant impact on strategic 
actions and organizational outcomes. Second, the results report that the impacts of 
intangible assets could go beyond a simple linear relation and might be in contrast to 
general expectations depending on the context of organizational practice (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). Third, the study demonstrates that companies can take advantage of 
“economies of scale” benefits of action-specific factual intangible assets and of 
“economies of scope” benefits of general perceptual intangible assets. Finally, Capron 
and Shen (2007) indicated that most acquisition research studied only public targets. This 
research contributes by including both publically and privately held targets as well as 
disclosed and undisclosed deals. 
In conclusion, this dissertation tries to advance the current understanding of 
corporate reputation by examining the underlying mechanisms of corporate reputation 
formation as well as its influence on organizational actions both theoretically by applying 
different theoretical paradigms and empirically by utilizing distinct analytical techniques. 
The results of the three essays provide insights that help advance academic knowledge in 
the reputation field as well as related disciplines.  
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II. ESSAY 1: 
MULTI-LEVEL SIGNALING IMPACTS ON INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE 
REPUTATION ASSESSMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate reputation is a collective perception of firm stakeholders (Fombrun, 
1996) and an intangible asset which can be a source of competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991). Firms place a high priority on building a favorable reputation, and they deploy 
significant resources towards this purpose. In academia, corporate reputation attracts 
attention of scholars from different disciplines such as economics, accounting, finance, 
sociology, management, and marketing (Gotsi & Wilson, 2001). One area of particular 
scholarly focus is the antecedents (determinants) of corporate reputation. Research 
studies report a wide range of reputation antecedents, such as financial performance, 
product/service quality, employee quality, social responsibility (Fombrun, 1998; Lewis, 
2001), customer satisfaction and trust (Walsh, Mitchell, Jackson, & Beatty, 2009), and 
financial disclosure and corporate governance (Gabbioneta, Ravasi, & Mazzola,  2007), 
which have been predominantly examined at the firm level. By contrast, the multi-level 
nature of reputation determinants has received limited attention, despite the multi-level 
nature of reputation influences or signals and the fact that some of the most meaningful 
reputation assessments are conducted by individuals, who use these assessments to make 
decisions about firm supportive behavior (Newburry, 2010). We attempt to further this 
research by examining the signals driving individual-level reputation assessments using a 
multi-level perspective. 
We believe this topic is important for multiple reasons. First, while most 
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corporate reputation studies have identified firm-level determinants, much less work has 
investigated industry- and country-level impacts on reputation. A firm’s reputation is 
highly affected by its industry’s reputation (Barnett & Hoffman, 2008; Winn, MacDonald, 
& Ziestsma, 2008). While firm-level reputation determinants such as financial 
performance, product/service quality, and social responsibility are essential across 
industries, the importance of industry factors should not be underestimated. For example, 
the forestry industry, due to environmental group pressures, has a lower industry 
reputation (Winn et al., 2008), which impacts assessments of firms operating in that 
industry. Additionally, country-level factors may affect corporate reputation (Deephouse, 
Li & Newburry, 2009). Low corruption levels, high environmental standards, and 
efficient business environments impact perceptions of a country’s population, which 
consequently may affect their evaluations of firms. 
Second, most previous work only examined the determinants of corporate 
reputation at one analysis level. In addition to investigating the effects of industry- and 
country-level reputation determinants, it is important to pay attention to the 
interdependence of these levels. Most prior reputation research does not account for the 
interdependence of individual-level data being nested within higher levels observation 
levels, which could significantly influence past results (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, 
Congdon, & du Toit, 2004). In addition to directly impacting the general public’s 
assessment of an organization’s reputation, firm- and industry-level factors are influenced 
by country-level factors, which can only be captured in a cross-level model.  
Third, prior research has established the importance of environment signals in 
influencing firm reputations (Maheswaran, 1994). However, this theory has not 
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considered the multi-level nature of signals that individuals receive when evaluating 
reputations. Accordingly, we theoretically contribute to reputation research by applying 
signaling theory at multiple levels to enrich our understanding of this topic. 
Accordingly, in order to further develop the reputation literature, this study 
analyzes firm-, industry-, and country-level effects on individual-level corporate 
reputation assessments. The manuscript is structured in four sections. The first part 
reviews past research on corporate reputation and signaling theory. Next, hypotheses are 
developed. Third, methodology, analysis, and results are presented. Using data from the 
Reputation Institute’s 2009 RepTrak Pulse study, in a hierarchical linear model, we test 
our theory using 71,368 individual evaluations of 615 firms operating in 33 countries. 
Finally, the manuscript ends with a discussion and conclusion section. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Corporate Reputation 
The definition and measurement of corporate reputation have been long debated. 
Fombrun and Van Riel (1997) regarded corporate reputation as an ambiguous concept. 
Since then, significant work has clarified the meaning of reputation by studying 
differences and similarities in existing reputation definitions. According to Fombrun and 
Rindova’s (1996) cross-disciplinary literature review, one reason for this ambiguity is the 
application of the corporate reputation concept by scholars in different disciplines: 
economists (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988), sociologists (Shaphiro, 1987), strategists (Caves 
& Porter, 1977), and marketing researchers (Dowling, 1986), among others.  
Another reason for this ambiguity is a lack of consensus on the relationship of 
corporate image, corporate identity, and corporate reputation. Gotsi and Wilson (2001) 
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categorized corporate reputation definitions into two schools of thought: analogous and 
differentiated. Scholars in the analogous school (e.g., Dowling, 1986) consider corporate 
image and reputation as the same concept and use them interchangeably. However, in the 
differentiated school, scholars separate these concepts. Three views exist in the 
differentiated school of thought on the relationship between corporate image and 
corporate reputation (Gotsi & Wilson, 2001). Scholars having the first view (e.g., Brown 
& Dacin, 1997) consider them as two separate concepts and even claim a negative 
association between them. According to this view, image can mean falsehood (Grunig, 
1993) and is not necessarily a reflection of corporate reality. Contrary to the first view, 
the second view in the differentiated school of thought considers reputation as one 
dimension of corporate image (e.g., Barich & Kotler, 1991). In this view, image is the 
perception of stakeholders about the company and reputation is one component which 
shape this perception. The third view in the differentiated school considers image as a 
component of corporate reputation (e.g., Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). This view integrates 
two dimensions into corporate reputation: multi-stakeholder perceptions and history or 
time. Thus, Fombrun and Rindova (1996: 3) defined corporate reputation as “… a 
collective representation of a firm’s past actions and results that describe the firm’s 
ability to deliver valued outcomes to multiple stakeholders. It gauges a firm’s relative 
standing both internally with employees and externally with its stakeholders, in both its 
competitive and institutional environments.” In this view, corporate image is the 
perception of external stakeholders (customers, general public) about a corporation. 
Corporate identity is the perception of internal stakeholders (managers, employees) about 
the corporation and reputation is the combination of both perceptions.  
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In a recent study, Barnett, Jermier, and Lafferty (2006) reviewed prior corporate 
reputation definitions to integrate them and push the concept toward ‘one vision, one 
voice’. Building upon Bennett and Kottasz (2000), assembling corporate reputation 
definitions from 1965 to 2003 together, they clustered definitions into three categories: 
awareness, assessment, and assets. The awareness cluster includes scholars (e.g., Balmer, 
2001; Roberts & Dowling, 2002) who define corporate reputation as perception of 
audience. A second group of scholars (e.g., Gotsi & Wilson, 2001; Deephouse, 2000) 
look at reputation as a judgment and estimation, forming the assessment cluster. Finally, 
the assets cluster includes definitions considering reputation as something of value to a 
firm (e.g., Goldberg, Cohen, & Fiegenbaum, 2003). In addition, Barnett et al. (2006) 
defined corporate image and identity independently from a stakeholder perspective. 
Corporate identity is considered as the ‘core’ of the firm, a concept close to corporate 
culture. Corporate image is defined as an observer’s (internal or external) perception of 
the firm, the outcome of a firm’s public relation, marketing, and communication activities 
to shape the impressions of people. Consequently, corporate reputation is the judgment 
and assessment of observers influenced by corporate image and has value for a firm. 
Barnett et al. (2006: 34) concluded their work by proposing a definition for corporate 
reputation: “Observers’ collective judgments of a corporation based on assessments of 
the financial, social, and environmental impacts attributed to the corporation over time”. 
The lack of consensus on a corporate reputation definition has lead to the 
development of different tools for measuring reputation. These tools differ in three ways. 
First, they differ in their underlying corporate reputation definitions. Second, the groups 
who answered and completed reputation surveys differ to achieve consistency with the 
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underlying theory of the measurement tool. Finally, the items and dimensions in the 
measurement tools differ. A wide range of corporate reputation measures have been 
developed by business media and academic scholars, such as Fortune’s Most Admired 
Companies (MAC), the RepTrack Pulse (Fombrun & Van Riel, 2004), and the Corporate 
Personality Scale (Davies, Chun, Da Silva, & Roper, 2003). 
From the MAC perspective, reputed firms are those strong in characteristics 
important to executives and financial analysts. Therefore, every year CEOs and financial 
analysts are asked to rate the ten largest firms in their industry based on eight 
characteristics: quality of management, quality of products and services, innovativeness, 
financial soundness, ability to attract, develop, and keep talented people, long-term 
investment value, responsibility to the community and environment, and wise use of 
corporate assets. The main limitations of MAC lists are, first, the dominant dimension 
underlying the measures is financial performance (Fryxell & Wang, 1994), and second, 
the lack of a sound theoretical framework (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
The Reptrak Pulse (Fombrun & Van Riel, 2004) is based on Fombrun’s (1996) 
reputation definition, emphasizing the perceptional-judgmental nature of corporate 
reputation as well as its multi-stakeholder nature. Therefore, the general public is asked 
to complete an online survey which assesses multiple firm reputation drivers. This 
measure also takes a broader geographic sampling frame than MAC since it examines 
reputations of the largest firms on a global basis.  
The Corporate Personality Scale (Davies et al., 2003) is based on the definition 
which defines corporate reputation as consisting of corporate image and identity. 
Therefore, customers (representative of external stakeholders and consistent with their 
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definition of corporate image) and employees (representative of internal stakeholders and 
consistent with their definition of corporate identity) are surveyed regarding their 
perceptions of a firm’s personality. The measure was developed based on Aaker’s (1997) 
brand personality (sincerity, excitement, ruggedness, sophistication, competence) and 
extended from a brand level to an organizational level and includes seven dimensions: 
agreeableness, enterprise, competence, chic, ruthlessness, machismo, and informality. 
In this study, we adopt Fombrun and Rindova’s (1996) reputation definition (cited 
above) and use the RepTrack Pulse measure of corporate reputation which was developed 
in line with this definition to investigate the hierarchical effects of corporate reputation 
stimuli on perceptions of the general public. This definition is most consistent with our 
theory, which advances that members of the public receive reputation signals at multiple 
levels.  
Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory (Spence, 1973) is an information economics theory which 
discusses the behavior of interacting factors under information asymmetry and 
uncertainty conditions. In signaling theory, two parties interact with each other: agents or 
sellers and principals or buyers. The environment is uncertain and agents have 
information that principals do not have. For example, in a marketplace, there are sellers 
of a product competing with each other that have information about product quality 
which is not necessarily available to buyers. Therefore, sellers try to send signals such as 
price, warrantees, or return policies to buyers to demonstrate a higher quality of their 
products.  
Spence (1973) explained signaling theory using the example of conditions 
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employers face when reviewing job applicants. Employers receive two kinds of 
information from job applicants. One set of attributes are those job applicants generally 
do not have discretion to change, such as age, gender and ethnicity. Spence (1973) called 
this group of information “indices”. The other attribute group includes characteristics 
which are subject to manipulation by job applications, like education, which Spence 
(1973) labeled as “signals.” Spence (1973) consequently defined the signaling cost as the 
cost to adjust or manipulate the signal. A critical assumption is that signaling costs should 
be negatively correlated with the productive capability of job applicants (Spence, 1973). 
This critical assumption is the reason for a variety in job applicants’ decisions toward 
education. In other words, without this balancing assumption, all job applicants would 
make the same decision and would have the same education level. In the example of 
multiple sellers of a product, the signaling costs incurred to a seller and their product 
quality are negatively correlated: the higher the product quality, the lower the signaling 
costs.  
Signaling is a dynamic process. In the first point in time, agents (sellers or job 
applicants) send a signal and principals (buyers or employers) receive and translate the 
signal to separate (distinguish) agents and make the transaction (buy or hire). After the 
transaction, principals get feedback (of quality of product or job applicant), learn through 
this experience and are better able to separate agents next time. This learning process 
from agents to principals and vice versa continues until a state of equilibrium is achieved 
(Spence, 1973). Two equilibrium types are separating equilibrium and pooling 
equilibrium (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993). In separating equilibrium, the value of a 
strategy and its cost lead agents to choose different actions. For example, utility 
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maintenance companies can adopt a three-day guarantee strategy to show their service 
quality, which is a valuable strategy for buyers to distinguish between companies. If it 
takes five days for a maintenance company to deliver the service, the cost of a three-day 
guarantee would be more than its benefits. Therefore, a low-quality service company 
would not adopt this strategy. In other words, in separating equilibrium, principals can 
separate agents. Pooling equilibrium occurs when both low and high quality agents can 
choose the same strategy and principals cannot separate them. This is a condition in 
which both service companies can deliver their services in three days. Therefore, only if 
separating equilibrium occurs, the strategy is a signal which helps principals to 
distinguish between agents (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993). 
Signaling theory has been widely used in management, marketing, and finance 
contexts, including research studies on: board of director structure (Miller & Triana, 
2009), corporate social performance (Turban & Greening, 1997), insider stock trading 
(Sanders & Boivie, 2004), labor markets (Spence, 1973), organizational reputation 
(Behrend, Barker, & Thomson, 2009), new product introduction (Akerlof, 1970), and 
price (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986). However, one factor that has not been studied is the 
multilevel impacts of signals. Signaling studies investigated the predicting effects of 
different signals on the desired output factors, without examining the simultaneous 
impact of factors at multiple levels. Additionally, the interaction of signals with each 
other in a hierarchical manner is missing from previous studies. Thus, while previous 
studies demonstrated reputation impacts of firm-level (e.g., Miller & Triana, 2009), 
industry-level (e.g., Winn et al., 2008) and country-level (e.g., Apéria, Simcic Brønn, & 
Schultz, 2004) factors, these reputation signals have not been simultaneously examined. 
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In addition to these direct effects, the interaction of factors at multiple levels has not been 
examined. In sum, this study intends to investigate not only the individual effect of each 
signal, but also the hierarchical effects of them. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In studying multilevel determinants of individual corporate reputation 
assessments, three sets of hypotheses are suggested: firm-, industry-, and country-level 
factors. By doing so, we attempt to disentangle the impacts of multi-level signals on 
individual-level corporate reputation perceptions. 
Firm-level Hypotheses 
 In this section, we examine reputation assessments as they are impacted by 
financial performance, social performance, and firm size. Firm characteristics and 
performance send signals which help stakeholders learn ‘true’ attributions of the firm and 
consequently shape their perceptions about the firm. 
Financial performance. From an economic perspective of reputation, under 
information asymmetries between a firm and it stakeholders, stakeholder perceptions are 
formed based on the signals they receive from a firm’s past and current actions. One such 
signal is financial performance, which serves as a separating signal that allows observers 
to distinguish between firms. McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneweiss (1988) found that 
return on assets was significantly correlated with firm reputational rankings. Stakeholders 
interpret financial signals differently. To the general public, stronger financial results 
reflects superior business models, more effective management, better resource 
deployment, more productive personnel, and better overall fit between resources and 
strategies. This is consistent with the resource-based view, which equates firm success 
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with its resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991). Therefore, high financial performance 
positively affects the general public’s perceptions of firms (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
Investors and creditors, on the other hand, translate good financial performance to 
indicate a company’s healthy and well-managed standing and that a company is able to 
achieve positive future results (Gabbioneta et al., 2007). Internal stakeholders, managers 
and employees, have access to internal information and can analyze the cause and effects 
of financial results for future modifications. In total, financial success affects internal and 
external stakeholders’ perceptions in a consistent way and raises their admiration and 
respect for the firm. Therefore, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship between financial performance and 
corporate reputation. 
Social performance. An institutional perspective on corporate reputation argues 
that information exchange among diverse institutional actors reduces uncertainty about 
the ‘true’ attributes of an organization and shapes its reputation among its stakeholders 
(Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). The importance of institutional actors in 
acquiring and disseminating information about an organization becomes clearer 
considering that legitimacy is a critical resource for an organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Social performance encompasses a wide range of behaviors which contribute to 
interests of different stakeholders. Although social behaviors such as community 
engagement, transparency, philanthropic initiatives, and utilization of sustainable 
resources are strategic choices and signal an organization’s intention to comply with its 
societal responsibilities, they are costly and therefore separating signals reflecting the 
‘true’ capabilities of the firms. According to attribution theory (Weiner, 1985), 
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stakeholders make inferences based on the signals they receive from firm behavior which 
lead them to possess good feelings about, to admire and to respect firms with 
characteristics that align with their interests. In fact, many scholars define social 
responsibility as an integral part of reputation (Fombrun, 1998). Brammer and Pavelin 
(2006) found that social performance is one of the determinants of good corporate 
reputation. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between social performance and 
corporate reputation. 
Firm size. According to Rindova and colleagues (2005), two organizational 
reputation dimensions are perceived products/services quality and firm prominence. Due 
to a lack of information, the general public is often not aware of the ‘true’ quality of a 
firm’s products or services. Stakeholders attribute large firms as possessing financial 
resources, talented employees, advanced technology, and effective networks, all of which 
are instrumental in producing quality products/services. In other words, although 
stakeholders are uncertain about output quality, firm size signals clues for evaluating 
quality. Therefore, firm size reduces the information uncertainty of stakeholders, and 
shapes positive opinions about the firm. On the other hand, under conditions of 
uncertainty, stakeholders’ opinions are influenced by the opinions of third parties (Rao, 
Davis, & Ward, 2000). Hence, information dissemination by third parties determines the 
prominence of a firm. Larger firms are more visible and more covered by media and as a 
result, their signals are more available and richer. Therefore, stakeholders are better and 
more quickly informed about them. In total, larger firms obtain better perceived quality 
and are more prominent. Therefore, there is less uncertainty about them and stakeholders 
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trust them more. Consequently, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a positive relationship between firm size and corporate 
reputation. 
Industry-level Hypotheses.   
While there is a large body of literature on corporate reputation, industry effects 
on reputation have been understudied. While firm-level factors send firm-specific signals 
to stakeholders, industry-level factors convey more general information about the nature 
and identity of member firms. Thus, they convey broader-level signals that influence 
perceptions of all firms in an industry. In this subsection, we examine how industry-level 
factors affect corporate reputation.  
Service industries. Industries can be broadly categorized into manufacturing and 
services based on information uncertainty about the quality of their outputs. Scholars 
defined three groups of outputs (products/services): search, experience, and credence 
(Darby & Karni, 1973; Nelson, 1970). While quality of search goods can be determined 
before purchase (electronic appliances), quality of experience goods can be learned only 
after use (automobile services) and quality of credence goods are difficult to ascertain 
even after use (management consulting). Services, which are intangible, perishable, 
customized, simultaneously produced and consumed, produced with consumer 
participation, and used without ownership (Boddewyn, Halbrich, & Perry, 1986), fall 
under the experience and credence categories, where information uncertainty about their 
quality is higher than for manufacturing products, and this higher uncertainty lowers trust 
about a firm. From a transaction cost economics perspective (Williamson, 1975), 
stakeholders incur information gathering and measurement costs (North, 1990) to reduce 
23 
information asymmetry. As these costs are lower for search goods and generally 
manufacturing products (Kim & Choi, 2003), stakeholders are more informed about 
manufacturing businesses, lowering the level of information uncertainty in these 
industries compared to services. Therefore, manufacturing businesses are more reliable to 
stakeholders, leading individuals to possess more positive opinions about manufacturing 
firms. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Firms in manufacturing industries have more favorable reputations 
than those in the service sector. 
Industrial products. Companies can also be categorized based on their 
customers. One category of companies mainly produces intermediary products and offers 
services to other businesses (B2B), while another category mainly offers services and 
products to end users (B2C). Unlike companies in B2C industries, companies in B2B 
businesses have more concentrated customers with larger transaction volumes per 
customer (Backhaus, 2006; Kotler & Keller, 2006). In addition, B2B businesses do not 
have direct relationships with end-users, as this relationship passes through B2C 
companies (Kotler & Keller, 2006). Furthermore, the products and services offered by 
B2B firms are more complicated and require more expertise than those offered by B2C 
counterparts. Therefore, information asymmetry is greater in B2B compared to B2C 
businesses, which as a result, influences both the quality perception and prominence 
dimensions of reputation (Rindova et al., 2005). On the other hand, although both end 
users and business customers face information uncertainty about quality and credibility of 
producers and service providers, business customers are more inclined to pay information 
gathering costs. This reduces the efforts of B2B companies in communicating about 
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themselves in more general communication media by concentrating mainly on expertise 
media. In contrast, in order to reduce information asymmetry and introduce their ‘true’ 
attributions, companies in B2C industries send information and signals more frequently 
and in larger scope. As a result, there is less information asymmetry between B2C firms 
and the general public, which increases the public’s level of trust and consequently leads 
to more positive opinions of these companies relative to B2B companies, where 
information uncertainty is higher. Accordingly, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Firms in B2C industries have more favorable reputations than those 
in B2B industries. 
Industry reputation. Industry reputation is defined as “the collective judgments 
of an industry by stakeholders and the general public, where that judgment is based on 
assessments of the economic, social and environmental impacts attributed to that industry 
over time” (Winn et al., 2008: 36). Under conditions of information asymmetry and 
uncertainty about practices, legitimacy, and the quality of a firm, industry reputation acts 
as a common characteristic of member firms which signals identity and general firm 
attributes and makes first impressions among stakeholders. While companies benefit 
from good industry reputations when firm-specific information is lacking, businesses in 
controversial industries such Tobacco suffer from stereotyping effects (Maheswaran, 
1994). Industry reputations can strongly influence public perceptions of member firms. 
Specifically, growth of activism such as environmental or human rights activism 
accompanied with media coverage increases the sensitivity of society toward the social 
and environmental behavior of firms. Influence groups and media challenging the 
legitimacy of industries whose operations result in products or byproducts which harm 
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society or the environment can cost all industry members by reducing the trust and 
respect of their stakeholders. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Firms in controversial industries have less favorable reputations. 
Country-level Hypotheses 
Country-level factors influence individual reputation assessments in three ways. 
First, reputation is formed based on firm actions, which are highly dependent on the 
context of their operations. Second, a country’s infrastructure facilitates information 
circulation, which affects general public perceptions. Third, people in different countries 
with different socio-cultural backgrounds interpret information they receive differently. 
Therefore, in this section, we examine the direct effects of three aspects of the business 
environment - economic, institutional, and human development – as well as their indirect 
influences through industry-level factors on reputation evaluations by the general public. 
Economic development. Where there are uncertainty and asymmetries in 
information, a country’s economic development level signals infrastructural, 
technological, and economic advancement of a corporation’s environment. In other words, 
efficient infrastructure, advanced technologies, and potential economic opportunities are 
prerequisites of economic development. Efficient infrastructure and advanced 
technologies help firms lower production costs and improve the quality of and innovation 
in products and services, and consequently may result in more favorable evaluations of 
the general public about focal firms (Lewis, 2001). In addition, economic development 
paves the way for firms to invest in research and development and use more sustainable 
resources, which signal firms’ responsible behavior towards society, and as result, 
facilitate customer trust, an instrument for developing corporate reputation (Walsh et al., 
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2009). Furthermore, in economically advanced countries, the infrastructure is more 
effective in disseminating information, and therefore, signals are richer and more 
available. Companies can better communicate with their general publics due to greater 
communication media availability (newspapers, TV channels, and internet) and greater 
use and higher penetration of these media. Therefore, companies can better inform their 
audiences about their financial and social activities, which reduces information 
asymmetry and improves the general public’s perceptions towards them (Aperia et al., 
2004). Higher purchasing power and better distribution of wealth not only enable people 
to afford more expensive products/services, but also creates a larger market for 
innovative, higher quality, and more environmentally friendly products and services. In 
sum, an economically developed context creates a more suitable environment for firms to 
offer higher quality products and services, be more innovative, and act more responsible - 
all essential factors in forming reputations. Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): There is a positive relationship between a country’s economic 
development level and firm reputations in the country. 
Institutional development. Institutional development is another contextual 
characteristic which signals a firm’s stakeholders when they lack complete information 
about the firm. Developed institutional environments are characterized by high regulatory 
quality, better developed legal systems, less corruption, economic freedom, and greater 
competition (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000; Chen, Newburry & Park, 2009). In 
addition to setting high quality regulations, enforcement of these laws determines 
institutional system strength. Therefore, it is expected that strong institutional systems 
create competitive business environments, effective economic structures, and sustainable 
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environmental conditions. Aperia et al. (2004) reports that monopolistic behavior of firms 
is one reason they achieve lower reputations. Therefore, companies in more developed 
institutional environments which are more competitive are expected to be perceived 
better by the public. Furthermore, companies in more competitive and effective 
environments are in better contexts to produce and offer higher quality products and 
services, be more innovative, and be more responsible to their internal and external 
stakeholders, all of which send positive signals to the general public. In more 
institutionally advanced systems, controlling mechanisms, media, and activist groups are 
more developed. These independent third parties are sources that disseminate information 
and influence general public perceptions. Therefore, the general public is better informed 
and information uncertainty is lower in institutionally developed environments where 
signals are transmitted more effectively, leading people to perceive firms as more 
reputable. Accordingly, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): There is a positive relationship between a country’s institutional 
development level and firm reputations in the country. 
Human development. Human development is another aspect of a country which 
directly affects a company’s business environment. Human development is positively 
correlated with life expectancy, knowledge and education, and standard of living (UNDP, 
2009). Trust is one of the critical determinants of corporate reputation (Walsh et al., 
2009). Knowing the complications of winning trust of the general public when they are 
educated and have access to a variety of information sources, firms become more 
considerate in their actions. Accordingly, similar to the prior hypotheses, human 
development of a country may lead the general public to assess firm reputations more 
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positively. 
On the other hand, people in more developed societies have higher expectations 
from their focal companies, which are perceived to be the engines for their country’s 
development (Deephouse et al., 2009). One of these expectations is the firm’s 
responsibility towards its society, which affects firm reputations. In Scandinavian 
countries, which are among the most developed countries in terms of human development, 
Aperia et al. (2004) found that “treatment of employees” and “treatment of environment” 
are the most important dimensions of corporate social responsibility. If their expectations 
are higher than the performance of firms, it could result in dissatisfaction and 
consequently lower opinions about focal firms (Deephouse et al., 2009). Nonetheless, this 
counterargument aside, we suggest that:  
Hypothesis 9 (H9): There is a positive relationship between a country’s human 
development level and firm reputations in the country. 
Industries across countries. In addition to the direct effects hypothesized above, 
country characteristics interact with industry-level factors to influence corporate 
reputation assessments. Economic development which creates productive infrastructures 
and technologies and institutional development which brings quality institutional 
structure, along with human development which promotes critical minds, pave the way 
for organizations to be more innovative and produce quality products/services, for media 
and activism to more profoundly disseminate information, and for the general public to 
be more analytical and critical. Therefore, in more developed countries, information 
asymmetry and uncertainty between an organization and its stakeholders is lower and 
stakeholders are better aware of an organization’s true attributes. As argued earlier, due 
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to lower information uncertainty, manufacturing industries have relatively higher 
reputations than service industries. However, more developed environments bring 
opportunities for service industries to be more effective in conveying their signals and 
messages, and close the difference between manufacturing and service sectors. By 
lowering information asymmetry and consequently obtaining trust and esteem from their 
stakeholders, service firms improve their reputation. In other words, although service 
firms generally have lower reputations relative to manufacturing firms, development in 
business environments creates opportunities for them to close this gap. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 10 (H10): As a country’s development level increases, the negative impact 
of operating in a service industry on firm reputation decreases. 
Similar to service firms, firms in B2B industries benefit relatively more from 
business environment development than firms in B2C industries. Since it is more 
expensive to reduce information asymmetry in less developed economies, and 
information uncertainty is higher in B2B industries, economic, technological, and 
institutional development enable B2B businesses to communicate with their stakeholders 
and the general public more effectively and efficiently. Therefore, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 11 (H11): As a country’s development level increases, the negative impact 
of operating in a B2B industry on firm reputation decreases. 
Institutional development in advanced countries prepares the environment for 
emergence and operation of critical media, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and 
stakeholder activist and movement groups, which have influential roles in monitoring 
businesses and informing society. More specifically, in advanced countries, these 
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organizations closely observe firm behavior in controversial industries and disseminate 
more signals and information, and as a result, the general public in those countries is 
more aware and sensitive to social responsibilities of businesses. Therefore, while in 
general, industry reputation influences corporate reputation, controversial industries are 
specifically in the center of attention in more advanced countries by media, NGOs, and 
activist groups, which affects the reputations of member firms. Accordingly, we propose: 
Hypothesis 12 (H12): As a country’s development level increases, the negative impact 
of operating in a controversial industry on firm reputation increases. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
In line with this multi-level special issue, our analyses rely on three levels of data. 
We utilized a sample of individual-level perception data regarding firm reputations 
collected by the Reputation Institute in February 2009. The Reputation Institute’s 2009 
study examined the 600 largest companies in the world based upon sales volume. 
Additional companies were added to the study to balance the sample for the purpose of 
comparison in industries and countries. The study companies come from 33 countries. 
The Reputation Institute administered a multi-item online survey about the perceptions of 
individuals on different aspects of corporate reputation. Respondents who have at least 
minimal familiarity with a focal company were selected from a pool of respondents based 
on a screening criterion to answer 3 out of 4 questions about the company (Asher, 2004). 
Respondents were also chosen to represent the general population of their countries based 
on gender and age. Respondents answered questions in their local language to eliminate 
biases associated with an English-only questionnaire (Harzing, 2005), which was 
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translated and back translated by professionals fluent in both English and the language of 
questionnaire administration to ensure accuracy.  
Firm/industry-level and country-level data are from 2007 to consider the lag 
effect of these signals on individual reputation perceptions. Firm-level data were 
collected from Compustat North America, Compustat Global, Compustat Financial 
Services, and Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD). Due to missing secondary data for 
some firms (described below), the resulting sample size was 615 firms for our main 
analyses. Country-level data were collected from different sources including: World 
Bank, IMF, UNDP, UNCTAD, CIA World Fact Book, and Heritage Foundation.   
Dependent Variable 
RepTrack Pulse is the Reputation Institute’s measure for corporate reputation, 
consisting of four items: “good overall reputation;” “a company I have a good feeling 
about;” “a company that I trust;” and “a company that I admire and respect” (Reputation 
Institute, 2007). These general descriptors are consistent with past research finding that 
items measuring general perceptions tend to have greater face validity across cultures 
than more specific culturally derived items (e.g., Scandura, Williams, & Hamilton, 2001). 
Respondents evaluated each item on a 7-point scale, where “1” indicates “I strongly 
disagree” and “7” indicates “I strongly agree”. Respondents also had the option to 
indicate “Not Sure”. Although interpretation of items can vary across cultures (Gardberg, 
2006), their factor structure was evaluated in each country and found to be equivalent. 
LISREL analyses confirmed the unidimensionality, convergent validity, and fit of the 
scale items. The scale Chronbach Alpha is 0.963.  
Independent Variables 
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Firm-Level Variables. To measure Financial Performance (H1), we used ROE 
since our sample includes both manufacturing and service firms. Given a lack of 
comparable international data on Social Performance, we tested H2 in a smaller sample 
of 120 US firms. Social performance is measured by two variables from KLD: number of 
concerns and number of strengths, referring to the number of actions or behaviors of a 
firm which have been considered as negative social behavior by experts and the total 
number of positive social performance actions. An alternate individual-level measure 
based on perceptions of a firm’s social performance was also used to corroborate the 
results. Firm Size (H3) was measured as total revenue in 2007.  
Industry-Level Variables. Manufacturing (H4) is dichotomous, indicating if a 
firm was in a manufacturing or service industry. B2B (H5) is dichotomous, indicating if a 
firm’s customers are primarily other businesses, as opposed to end consumers. 
Controversial (H6) is dichotomous, indicating firms that operate in industries known to 
be controversial based on KLD categorizations. In our case, these included Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Military and firearms, and Petroleum. 
Country-Level Variables. Economic Development (H7) is measured by GDP, 
and the GINI index, which indicates the degree of income inequality in a nation. We did 
not use GDP per capita due to high correlations with our other country-level variables. 
For Institutional Development (H8), we used the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom, which is based on ten measures: business freedom, trade freedom, 
fiscal freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial 
freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom. Finally, Human 
Development (H9) is measured using country education levels, represented by the 
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percentage of students in primary, secondary and tertiary education as reported by UNDP. 
Note that we considered using the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) for this 
variable, but chose education due to high correlations between HDI and our other 
country-level variables. 
Interaction Variables. Interactions proposed in hypotheses 10-12 were created in 
the program HLM6. Business/industry variables were group centered in the model and 
country variables were grand centered to reduce multicollinearity issues.   
Control Variables 
 We controlled for individual-level respondent demographic characteristics. 
Gender is dichotomous, coded as “1” for females and “0” for males. Respondent Age is 
categorical, ranging from “1” to “10” where “1” is for respondents under 18 years old and 
“10” for those of over 60 years old. Education is categorical, ranging from “1” for 
respondents with less than a basic education to ‘7” if a respondent completed graduate 
school. Household Income is measured through different scales due to variability of 
living standards across the countries in our sample, and thereafter, these scores were 
standardized to be included in the same dataset (Craig & Douglas, 2000). The 
standardized Household Income variable is categorical with three levels: low income 
(coded as “1”), mid-level income (coded as “2”), and affluent (coded as “3”). 
Analysis 
To analyze the multilevel effects of our nested data in three levels (individual 
within company/industry within country), we used the hierarchical linear modeling 
program HLM 6 (Raudenbush et al., 2004). This program allowed us to control for the 
effect of each level on its nested level(s) and simultaneously take into account the 
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interdependence of individual-level data in higher level data, which ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression does not account for. Note that for our statistical analyses, firm- and 
industry-level variables were collapsed into one category. 
RESULTS 
 Tables 1.1,1.2, and 1.3 report the descriptive statistics and correlations for 
individual-, company/industry-, and country-level variables, respectively. 
TABLE 1.1: Individual-level Variables: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 
1 RepTrak Pulse 4.83 1.53     
2 Gender 1.48 0.50 0.02**    
3 Age 2.94 1.06 -0.06** -0.08**   
4 Education 2.48 0.68 0.02** -0.04** -0.11**  
5 Income 1.90 0.74 -0.00 -0.05** 0.08** 0.17** 
     N = 71,368; **p<.01; *p<.05 
TABLE 1.2: Firm-level Variables: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 ROE (H1) 0.18 1.60       
2 Social: Concerns (H2) 5.66 3.44 0.04      
3 Social: Strengths (H2) 5.89 4.19 -0.06 0.25**     
4 Revenue (H3) 35803 51801 0.00 0.58** 0.22**    
5 Manufacturing (H4) 0.58 0.49 0.03 0.28** 0.42** 0.13   
6 B2B (H5) 0.14 0.35 -0.00 0.11 0.09 -0.14** 0.37**  
7 Controversial (H6) 0.09 0.29 0.01 0.32** -0.11 0.24** 0.30** 0.00 
N = 615, except for social (concerns and strengths), where N=120; **p<.01; *p<.05 
TABLE 1.3: Country-level Variables: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
   N = 33; **p<.01; *p<.05 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 
1 GDP (H7) 1479.57 2508.13    
2 GINI Index (H7) 36.66 9.91 0.13   
3 Index of Economic Freedom (H8) 69.49 9.54 0.13 -0.26  
4 Education (H9) 0.94 0.07 0.06 -0.52** 0.52** 
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 Table 1.4 and 1.5 present the results of the hierarchical models used to test our 
hypotheses. Model 1 presents the base model testing hypotheses 1 and 3 to 9. Models 2, 3, 
and 4 repeat the analysis to test hypothesis 2, where models 2 and 3 only use the US 
subsample, while model 4 uses the entire sample. Models 5 through 16 investigate 
moderating effects of country-level predictors on industry-level factors. All models had 
significant Chi-squares (p<.001). To minimize multicollinearity issues, each interaction is 
tested in a separate model.  
At the firm/industry level, Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive relationship between 
a firm’s financial performance and its reputation. The Model 1 results indicate that 
although the direction is as expected, the effect is not significant. Thus, hypothesis 1 is 
not supported.  
Hypothesis 2 suggested that firm social performance has a positive impact on 
their reputations. Due to an inability to collect firm-level data on social performance 
cross-nationally, this hypothesis is tested in Model 2 using a subsample of US firms 
based on KLD measures of firm social performance concerns as well as strengths. The 
effect of the number of CSR concerns (number of negative actions) on corporate 
reputation is negative and significant (p<.05), while the number of CSR strengths 
(number of positive actions) is highly significant and positive (p<.01) in predicting 
corporate reputation. Both these results support H2.  In Model 3, removing the highly 
correlated controversial industry variable makes these results even stronger. These results 
also maintain the same levels of significance when the variables are introduced 
individually into the models (not shown). Model 4 contains an alternate H2 test using an 
individual-level measure of perceptions of firm social performance, which allows us to 
36 
examine the relationship for the full sample. This result confirms the Model 2 and 3 
findings and is strongly significant (p<.001).  
Hypothesis 3 proposed that larger firms have more positive reputations. Although 
the variable sign is in the expected direction in Model 1, the result is not significant. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the general public more positively assesses firms in 
manufacturing industries compared to those in the service sector. The results strongly 
support (p<.001) this prediction. Hypothesis 5 suggested that the public has more positive 
opinions about B2C versus B2B firms. Again, the result is high significant (p<.001), 
supporting the hypothesis. Hypothesis 6 hypothesized that firms in controversial 
industries have lower reputations. The Model 1 results strongly support (p<.001) the 
hypothesis. 
 At the country-level, Hypothesis 7 suggested that a country’s economic 
development positively affects the reputations of its companies. Two aspects of economic 
development were tested. Production/infrastructure (GDP) is not significant. However, 
potential market, measured by equality of income distribution (GINI index), is highly 
significant (p<.001), but not in the predicted direction. Hypothesis 8 predicted that 
reputation assessments would be higher in countries with more developed institutional 
systems, as measured by the index of economic freedom. Although the model reports 
significant (p<.01) results, the direction is opposite to our expectations. Hypothesis 9 
suggested a positive relationship between a country’s human development level (proxied 
by education) and reputation assessments of firms operating in that country. Education 
was significant (p<.01), but again opposite the predicted direction.  
In addition to direct effects, we investigated whether country-level factors 
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moderate the effects of industry-level variables on reputation assessments. Hypothesis 10 
argued that as a country’s development level increases, the negative impact of operating 
in a service industry on firm reputations decreases. This hypothesis is tested through four 
development measures, separated into individual models to avoid multicollinearity issues. 
Models 5 and 8 testing economic (GDP) and human (education) development support 
Hypothesis 10 at the p<.05 level. Model 6 testing equality of income distribution (GINI 
Index) reports a significant result, but not in the expected direction and Model 7 testing 
institutional development does not find a significant result.  
Hypothesis 11 argued that in more developed countries, the negative impact of 
operating in B2B industries on firm reputation would be lower. Models 9, 10, 11, and 12 
test this hypothesis, Institutional development (Model 11) is significant (p<.05), but not 
in the predicted direction, while human development (education) (Model 12) is highly 
significant (p<.001) as expected. Finally, Models 13 through 16 test Hypothesis 12, 
which argued that as country development increases, the negative effects of operating in a 
controversial industry on firm reputation increase. Results highly support the hypothesis 
for the dimensions of economic (p<.01), institutional (p<.001), and human (p<.001) 
development. 
 We controlled for respondent gender, age, education, and income. The Model 1 
results indicate that among respondents from 33 countries, females and people with 
higher income significantly evaluate firms more positively, and more educated people 
possess significantly lower opinions about firms. Models 2 and 3 show that in the U.S., 
gender and income are not determining factors of firm reputation assessments and older 
and more educated people have significantly more negative perceptions about firms.
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TABLE 1.4: Regression Analysis Predicting Corporate Reputation Perception 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 5.01(.05)*** 5.15(.04)*** 5.15(.04)*** 5.04(.04)*** 5.01(.04)*** 5.01(.04)*** 5.01(.04)*** 5.01(.05)*** 
Level 1 – Individual         
   Gender 0.06(.01)*** 0.05(.03)+ 0.05(.03)+ -0.00(.01) 0.06(.01)*** 0.06(.01)*** 0.06(.01)*** 0.06(.01)*** 
   Age -0.02(.01) -0.05(.01)*** -0.05(.01)*** 0.01(.00)* -0.02(.01) -0.02(.01) -0.02(.01) -0.02(.01) 
   Education -0.07(.01)*** -0.11(.03)*** -0.11(.03)*** 0.03(.01)** -0.07(.01)*** -0.07(.01)*** -0.07(.01)*** -0.07(.01)*** 
   Household Income 0.03(.01)** 0.02(.02) 0.02(.02) 0.01(.01)** 0.03(.01)** 0.03(.01)** 0.03(.01)** 0.03(.01)** 
   Social Perf. (H2)    1.26(.01)***     
Level 2 – Comp./Ind.         
   Return on Equity (H1) 0.00(.01) -0.01(.09) -0.02(.08) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 
   Social Concerns (H2)  -.03(.01)* -.04(.01)**      
   Social Strengths (H2)  .03(.03)** .05(.01)***      
   Revenue (H3) 0.00(.00) -0.00(.00) -0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 
   Manufacturing (H4) 0.41(.06)*** 0.11(.11) 0.01(.10) 0.36(.05)*** 0.47(.08)*** 0.43(.06)*** 0.41(.06)*** 0.40(.06)*** 
   Bus.-to-Bus. (H5) -0.23(.06)*** -0.01(.15) -0.09(.13) -0.25(.06)*** -0.23(.06)*** -0.24(.06)*** -0.22(.06)*** -0.23(.06)*** 
   Controversial Ind. (H6) -0.41(.07)*** -0.39(.18)*  -0.36(.06)*** -0.41(.07)*** -0.41(.06)*** -0.41(.07)*** -0.41(.07)*** 
Level 3 – Country         
   GDP (H7) 0.00(.00)   0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 
   GINI Index (H7) 0.02(.01)***   0.02(.01)*** 0.02(.01)*** 0.02(.01)*** 0.02(.01)*** 0.02(.01)*** 
   IEF (H8) -0.01(.00)**   -.01(.00)** -0.01(.00)** -0.01(.00)** -0.01(.00)** -0.01(.00)** 
   Education (H9) -1.34(.42)**   -1.43(.34)*** -1.35(.42)** -1.34(.41)** -1.34(.41)** -1.35(.42)** 
   GDP*Manufact. (H10)      -0.00(.00)*    
   GINI*Manufact. (H10)       -0.01 (.01)*   
   IEF*Manufact. (H10)       -0.00(.01)  
   Educ*Manufact.. (H10)        1.20(.58)* 
         
X2 Levels 1 and 2 8432.62*** 1172.69*** 1246.89*** 15019.82*** 8284.77*** 8184.74*** 8436.55*** 8348.18*** 
X2 Level 3 118.96***   117.65*** 120.26*** 120.73*** 119.01*** 119.68*** 
Deviance 245,429 43,625 43631 100901 245,423 245,420 245,429 245,426 
N – Level 1 71368 12417 12417 44074 71368 71368 71368 71368 
N – Level 2 615 120 120 591 615 615 615 615 
N – Level 3 33   33 33 33 33 33 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10; Regressions present beta coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).  
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TABLE 1.5: Regression Analysis Predicting Corporate Reputation Perception 
Variable Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Intercept 5.01(.05)*** 5.01(.05)*** 5.01(.05)*** 5.01(.05)*** 5.01(.05)*** 5.01(.05)*** 5.01(.05)*** 5.01(.05)*** 
Level 1 – Individual         
   Gender 0.06(.01)*** 0.06(.01)*** 0.06(.01)*** 0.06(.01)*** 0.06(.01)*** 0.06(.01)*** 0.06(.01)*** 0.06(.01)*** 
   Age -0.02(.01) -0.02(.01) -0.02(.01) -0.02(.01) -0.02(.01) -0.02(.01) -0.02(.01) -0.02(.01) 
   Education -0.07(.01)*** -0.07(.01)*** -0.07(.01)*** -0.07(.01)*** -0.07(.01)*** -0.07(.01)*** -0.07(.01)*** -0.07(.01)*** 
   Household Income 0.03(.01)** 0.03(.01)** 0.03(.01)** 0.03(.01)** 0.03(.01)** 0.03(.01)** 0.03(.01)** 0.03(.01)** 
Level 2 – Comp./Ind.         
   Return on Equity (H1) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 
   Revenue (H3) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 
   Manufacturing (H4) 0.41(.06)*** 0.41(.06)*** 0.40(.06)*** 0.40(.06)*** 0.40(.06)*** 0.41(.06)*** 0.40(.06)*** 0.41(.06)*** 
   Bus.-to-Bus. (H5) -0.24(.06)*** -0.22(.06)*** -0.26(.06)*** -0.22(.05)*** -0.20(.07)*** -0.23(.06)*** -0.20(.06)*** -0.21(.06)*** 
   Controversial Ind. (H6) -0.42(.07)*** -0.41(.07)*** -0.43(.07)*** -0.43(.07)*** -0.34(.08)*** -0.43(.07)*** -0.39(.07)*** -0.43(.06)*** 
Level 3 – Country         
   GDP (H7) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 
   GINI Index (H7) 0.02(.01)*** 0.02(.01)*** 0.02(.01)*** 0.02(.01)*** 0.02(.01)*** 0.02(.01)*** 0.02(.01)*** 0.02(.01)*** 
   IEF (H8) -.01(.00)** -.01(.00)** -.01(.00)** -.01(.00)** -.01(.00)** -.01(.00)** -.01(.00)** -.01(.00)** 
   Education (H9) -1.34(.42)** -1.35(.42)** -1.35(.42)*** -1.35(.42)** -1.35(.42)** -1.35(.42)** -1.35(.41)** -1.35(.41)** 
   GDP*B2B (H11) 0.00(.00)        
   GINI*B2B (H11)  -0.00(.01)       
   IEF*B2B (H11)   -0.01(.00)*      
   Educ*B2B (H11)    1.31(.30)***     
   GDP*Controversy (H12)     -0.00(.00)**    
   GINI*Controversy (H12)      0.01(.01)   
   IEF*Controversy (H12)       -0.02(.00)***  
   Educ*Controversy (H12)        -1.52(.45)*** 
         
X2 Levels 1 and 2 8440.51*** 8416.85*** 8415.12*** 8362.19*** 8366.33*** 8461.49*** 8415.28*** 8423.07*** 
X2 Level 3 118.99*** 118.91*** 119.52*** 119.88*** 119.59*** 119.07*** 120.28*** 119.86*** 
Deviance 245,429 245,429 245,426 245,424 245,426 245,428 245,423 245,425 
N – Level 1 71368 71368 44074 71368 71368 71368 71368 71368 
N – Level 2 615 615 591 615 615 615 615 615 
N – Level 3 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10; Regressions present beta coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This study’s purposes were twofold. First, we aimed to investigate the 
determinants of the general public’s perceptions of firm reputations at different levels, 
including firm-level, industry-level, and country-level signals. Second, from a 
methodological perspective, this paper aimed to analyze the effects of interdependent 
predicting variables (individuals within companies/industries within countries) on a 
criterion variable. At the firm level, we studied the effects of financial performance, 
social performance, and firm size. At the industry level, industries were differentiated 
based on their output (manufacturing vs. service), customer (B2B vs. B2C), and 
reputation (controversial vs. non-controversial). At the country-level, direct effects of 
three aspects of country development including economic, institutional, and human 
development on corporate reputation were analyzed. In addition, we studied how 
country-level development moderates the effects of industry-level factors on firm 
reputation. Overall, although we found significant results for most of our direct-effect 
hypotheses as well as multiple moderating effects, surprisingly, our country-level results 
were consistently opposite to the direction we expected. 
 Looking at the firm-level results in more detail, the hierarchical linear model 
demonstrates support only for social performance. Consistent with past studies (Brammer 
& Pavelin, 2006; Fombrun, 1998), results showed that the general public has more 
positive opinions about socially responsible firms. Social performance was 
operationalized two ways – by the social behavior of firms based on the opinions of 
experts who monitored social practices of firms, and based on the general public’s 
perceptions of social performance. Both sets of results indicated that social performance 
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has a highly significant influence on corporate reputation. Combining the financial and 
social performance results suggest that while financial performance has been found to 
impact firm reputation measures computed by financial analysts (e.g., MAC), social 
performance is more important to the general public. 
We find strong evidence for industry effects on corporate reputation. First, we 
found strong evidence that manufacturing companies have more favorable reputations 
compared to service sector companies, consistent with Fombrun (1996) and Kim and 
Choi (2003). These results trace back to differences between services and products. Not 
only is controlling, improving, and maintaining high quality over time harder in services, 
but also evaluation of quality is more subjective. However, reputation has a strategic role 
in service industries, where consumers’ evaluations of service quality are incomplete 
before purchasing the service (Wang, Lo & Hui, 2003). Similarly, results demonstrated 
that firms in B2C businesses have relatively more favorable reputations than firms in 
B2B industries. While B2C companies have direct interaction with the general public, 
B2B firms are less engaged with end users. In addition, the higher complexity of B2B 
businesses and products/services deepens the information asymmetry between firms and 
stakeholders. In sum, the relatively higher information uncertainty in services compared 
to manufacturing and in B2B businesses compared to B2C counterparts confirms the 
importance of communication in shaping general public perceptions, which is consistent 
with Fombrun and Shanley (1990) findings. Additionally, we found strong evidence that 
firms in controversial industries had lower reputation assessments. Consistent with Winn 
et al. (2008), results were highly significant, emphasizing the influence of industry 
reputation signals. Unlike firm-level factors, industry reputation signals the nature and 
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identity of member firms. In other words, industry reputation conveys the common 
characteristics of member firms. When sufficient and reliable information about a firm is 
not available, the public generalizes industry reputations to member firms through 
stereotypical perceptions. Our analysis demonstrated that firms in controversial industries 
inherit the negative perceptions of the general public towards their industry. 
 At the country level, economic, institutional, and human development were 
examined. We found highly significant results suggesting that all three types of country-
level development negatively relate to reputation assessments, opposite to our predictions. 
Although the direction was not as expected, highly significant outcomes show the 
importance of country-level factors, and calls for more research in this relatively 
neglected research area. Our country-level results were consistent with Deephouse et al.’s 
(2009) firm-level finding that corporate reputation is higher in countries with lower 
institutional development. We could think of three reasons for the unexpected negative 
direction of these findings. First, the structure of economies varies depending on their 
development level. In the process of industrialization, countries are changing their 
agriculture-based economies to become more industrial- and manufacturing-based in 
nature. More advanced countries have passed this stage and are converting their industry-
based economies to become more knowledge- and service-oriented. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to see service sectors such as financial services, insurances, and 
telecommunication have a stronger role in more developed countries. Given our earlier 
result that service firms have lower reputations than manufacturing firms, people in more 
developed countries trust their companies less.  
Second, in more developed countries, institutions are stronger, corruption is lower, 
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government is more effective, and law enforcement is more serious (Hoskisson et al., 
2000; Chen et al., 2009), while media, news agencies, and newspapers are stronger and 
people are more educated. Therefore, activities of large visible firms are better captured, 
scandals are reported, cover ups are more difficult, and consequently, people receive 
more information and stronger signals about firms. By contrast, in less developed 
countries, large companies have more bargaining power vis-à-vis law enforcement and 
media. Thus, people in less developed countries would evaluate corporations with higher 
reputations due to the differentiated signals they receive.  
Third, expectations of firms differ between developed and less developed 
countries (Chen et al., 2009). Deephouse et al. (2009) argued that people in countries 
with lower institutional development levels compare private companies with less 
efficiently run state-owned companies. Therefore, they would more likely appreciate 
large private companies. On the other hand, people in countries with higher institutional 
development levels have post-materialist values (Inglehart & Abramson, 1999), and 
therefore, evaluate corporations less positively (Deephouse et al., 2009). In sum, country-
level reputation determinants shed light on new, and less studied mechanisms impacting 
corporate reputation. 
In addition to investigating the direct effects of various reputation predictors in a 
hierarchical linear model, this study analyzed how country-level factors moderate the 
impact of industry-level factors on reputation assessments. Results confirm past studies 
showing the importance of communication on influencing public perception (Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990) by comparing business environments with different capability levels in 
disseminating information. However, we add to previous work by highlighting the 
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importance of content and quality of disseminated information. While countries with 
advanced communication platforms help B2B businesses influencing public opinion in 
their favor, they also negatively affect firm reputations in controversial industries. We 
previously demonstrated that firms in manufacturing have more favorable reputations 
than firms in the service sector. However, our analyses indicated that in countries with 
higher education levels, operating in manufacturing industries has an even more 
favorable effect the firm’s reputation, suggesting that information and signals sent by 
service firms are less convincing for more educated people and casting new doubts about 
the reliability and trustworthiness of service firms.  
Similarly, country development affects the B2B–reputation assessment 
relationship. It was argued that due to larger information asymmetry, firms in B2B 
industries have lower reputations. Our cross-country analysis indicates that as country 
education level increases, the negative impact of operating in B2B industries decreases. 
This is mainly due to more effective and efficient communication between B2B firms and 
their stakeholders as both signal senders and receivers. Greater complexity of B2B output 
is one of the reasons for higher information asymmetry, which impacts firm reputations 
negatively. However, in more educated countries, stakeholders are more knowledgeable, 
which help B2B businesses reduce the information gap. Finally, the study shows that 
industry reputation has a stronger impact on firm reputation in more advanced countries. 
More specifically, firms operating in controversial industries such as the Tobacco 
industry suffer more from industry reputation in countries with higher economic, 
institutional, and human development levels. In developed countries, monitoring 
institutions such as standards and regulations, media, and activist groups are more 
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developed and infrastructure is more available for them to reach their audiences. In 
addition, people are more educated, and consequently, demonstrate greater concern for 
environmental issues and human rights. In total, this study demonstrates that the business 
environment strongly affects firm reputation assessments both directly, and through its 
indirect effects on industry-level factors. 
Our study findings also provide practical suggestions for managers. First, 
information asymmetry is a reason for low reputations. Results indicated that general 
public has more positive opinions if it is aware a firm is socially responsible. Therefore, 
effective communication with stakeholders can increase a firm’s reputation. This is 
particularly important for firms in service sectors and B2B industries where information 
uncertainty is higher, and in controversial industries, where stereotype effects are 
stronger and the public is less able to differentiate a firm from its peers. Second, 
companies performing in multiple industries and/or countries or planning to diversify 
should realize that reputation is a context-dependent phenomenon. In other words, having 
a favorable reputation in one industry or one country does not guarantee a favorable 
reputation in a new setting. Each industry/country has its own characteristics and requires 
customized strategies. Finally, companies should be aware that reputation is dynamic and 
stems from the general public’s expectations of a firm. Depending on their development 
level, societal expectations of firms differ. The generally lower reputations of firms in 
more advanced countries compared to less developed countries indicate that firms in 
developed countries have not adapted to society’s evolving needs, values, and 
expectations. 
 We acknowledge study limitations provide opportunities for future research. First, 
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we recognized the interdependence between firm-level and country-level variables, but 
we did not examine the effects of country-level factors on each of the firm-level factors 
in our model. It would be interesting to see how country-level factors moderate the firm-
level variable relationships with reputation. Second, corporate reputation is an aggregate 
of the general public’s perceptions about different aspects of a company, of which we 
only studied three: financial performance, social performance, and firm size. Future 
studies can investigate the effects of other aspects such as quality of leadership, corporate 
governance, workplace, level of international expansion, and age. Third, this paper only 
studied three types of industries. There is a need for deeper investigation of industry 
characteristics and their effects on corporate reputation. Fourth, minimal studies have 
examined country-level determinants of corporate reputation. Although we analyzed 
country-level factors in 33 countries, we did not investigate each country individually, 
which could explain more about the mechanisms underlying corporate reputation. In 
addition, examining the effects of other country-level factors such as culture or media 
effectiveness/penetration, would be worthwhile. Fifth, social performance was tested only 
on the subsample of US firms due to lack of a worldwide measure of social performance. 
It would be interesting to extend this analysis into other countries. Finally, this is a cross-
sectional study of corporate reputation. Future work can research reasons for corporate 
reputation changes. 
In summary, this study aimed to further the corporate reputation literature in two 
ways. Theoretically, there is a lack of studies analyzing industry- and country-level 
antecedents of corporate reputations, and we helped overcome this limitation by finding 
significant industry- and country-level effects, in addition to more commonly studied 
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firm-level variables. Methodologically, this study contributes in terms of using multi-
level analysis techniques to examine corporate reputation. Using multi-level analysis, this 
study recognizes the interdependence among the variables at different analysis levels and 
captures more accurate effects of higher level variables on our criterion variable. 
  
48 
III. ESSAY 2:  
THE IMPACT OF STAKEHOLDER POWER ON CORPORATE REPUTATION: 
A CROSS-COUNTRY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 
Why do corporations exist? The role of the business corporation in society is one 
of the oldest and most passionately debated topics in the social sciences (Jensen, 2001; 
Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Economists and strategy scholars characteristically offer 
utility- and efficiency-based explanations (see Williamson & Winter, 1991). According to 
this perspective, the corporation is a legal fiction, or “nexus of contracts” designed to 
generate and distribute wealth to its economic participants (Coff, 1999; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Sociological researchers tend to be more divided (Fligstein, 2001). 
While Weber (2002: 13), for instance, acknowledged that corporations serve as engines 
for rationalization and economic prosperity, he also viewed capitalism pessimistically as 
a “monstrous cosmos” that promotes depersonalization, commodification, and a reduced 
sense of societal obligation (see also Weber, 1978: 636). From a power-based perspective, 
the corporation serves as a political contest where influential actors operating both within 
and outside organizational boundaries struggle for control in order to define the 
objectives of the firm and further their interests (Fligstein, 1987; Ocasio, 1994; Perrow, 
1986; Pfeffer, 1981). Comparative corporate governance scholars stress how beliefs 
regarding the purpose and function of corporations differ across countries (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003; Guillén, 2000; Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
We seek to contribute to this literature by exploring the connection between the 
contrasting views of the role of the corporation in society and corporate reputation. 
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Defined as “a collective representation of a firm’s past actions and results that describe 
the firm’s ability to deliver valued outcomes to multiple stakeholders” (Fombrun & 
Rindova, 1996: 3), corporate reputation is an important intangible asset and a critical 
source of differentiation and competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Fombrun, 1996). 
Since its focus has been primarily on the firm, the reputation literature often implicitly 
treats the determinants of corporate reputation as being universal across countries (e.g., 
Love & Kraatz, 2009). The impact of national institutions on corporate reputation 
assessment has received comparatively less attention and is not fully understood 
(Gardberg, 2006). Building on research in corporate governance, we explore how societal 
differences in the allocation of power amongst stakeholders influence beliefs about the 
role of the business corporation, and in turn which firms achieve superior reputations.  
Similar to reputation research, the field of corporate governance is intimately 
linked to the relationship between stakeholders and the firm. Davis (2005: 143) describes 
corporate governance as the “structures, processes and institutions within and around 
organizations that allocate power and resource control among participants”. These 
participants include stakeholders such as shareholders, creditors, employees and 
customers, among others. Countries differ in the way that power is allocated across these 
groups, however, which is a reflection of each nation’s legal systems and overall 
institutional framework (Fiss, 2008; Roe, 2003). Stakeholders whose rights are privileged 
over others enjoy greater influence in shaping firm behavior and widely-held beliefs 
about the role of the business corporation in society (Chen, Newburry, & Park, 2009; 
Schneper & Guillén, 2004). People use these expectations as criteria to evaluate corporate 
reputations (Deephouse, Li, & Newburry, 2009). Therefore, the determination of 
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corporate reputation will vary from country to country, depending on differences in 
national institutions. 
Overall, we study how stakeholder power and interests affect organizational 
processes (corporate governance) and outcomes (corporate reputation). To accomplish 
this goal, we examine the general public’s evaluation of firms in 33 countries covering a 
wide range of economic, socio-cultural, and legal differences. We intend to make 
several contributions. First, the variety of countries in the sample allows this 
study to demonstrate how the drivers of corporate reputation vary across 
countries. Second, this paper broadens the scope of reputation research by examining the 
assessments of the general public. While a few exceptions exist (e.g., Deephouse, Li & 
Newburry, 2009), prior research has generally focused on the opinions of and/or used 
measures based on just one narrow constituency, such as financial analysts or top 
managers. Third, this study demonstrates the usefulness of the stakeholder-power 
perspective by examining the impact of stakeholders in determining the firm’s role in 
society and the types of organizational practices that receive favor and legitimacy 
(Deephouse & Carter, 2005). Finally, this paper demonstrates that despite economic and 
social consequences of globalization, corporate governance systems and the public’s 
expectations of firms have not converged (Davis & Marquis, 2005; Guillén, 2000; Weber, 
Davis & Lounsbury, 2009). Managers of multinational corporations must thus take local 
conditions into consideration when expanding their businesses into other countries  
Within the following section, we review past studies on corporate reputation and 
corporate governance. We then develop hypotheses predicting reputation assessments 
based on three aspects of firm performance, and how the impact of these performance 
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dimensions may vary due to the legal rights and power of three important stakeholder 
groups - shareholders, creditors and labor. The differing degree that these three groups 
receive legal protection has long been a focal topic in comparative corporate governance 
research (see Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Armour, Deakin, Lele & Simms, 2009; Deakin, 
2005). Our theoretical approach parallels Fligstein and Choo’s (2005) description of 
corporate governance as the result of corporate law, market regulation, and labor law. 
Likewise, Schneper and Guillén (2004) stress the importance of these three constituencies 
when evaluating how differences in stakeholder power affect organizational outcomes. 
We next present our theoretical model and empirical tests using a sample of 756 
corporations from 33 countries. We conclude with a discussion of our results. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Corporate Reputation  
Corporate reputation and its determinants have been studied by scholars 
emanating from a broad range of disciplines. These studies have shown that reputation 
assessments are associated with numerous important attributes, such as the quality of a 
firm’s products (Podolny, 1993), financial performance (Gabbioneta, Ravasi, & Mazzola, 
2007), social responsibility (Schwaiger, 2004), esteem (Hall, 1992), and trust (Walsh, 
Mitchell, Jackson, & Beatty, 2009), among other factors. While strategy and marketing 
scholars emphasized the factors determining corporate reputation and its heterogeneity 
among corporate audiences and stakeholders (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Hall, 1993), 
sociologists and psychologists concentrated on the mechanisms through which corporate 
reputation is formed (Bromley, 2001; Staw & Epstein, 2000). While comparative 
research is limited, some evidence suggests that the factors used in reputational 
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assessment may vary dramatically across countries. Despite cultural similarities between 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, for instance, Apéria and colleagues (2004) found 
significant differences in reputational assessments by inhabitants of those countries. 
Danish citizens provided higher reputational assessments of top tier domestic companies 
than Swedes and Norwegians. Additionally, while financial performance had the lowest 
weight amongst the corporate reputation determinants in Denmark and Norway, social 
responsibility was the least important factor in Sweden (Apéria et al., 2004). Based on 
their results, these researchers proposed that socio-cultural, legal, and other institutional 
differences served as an important cause of these variations. Likewise, Gardberg (2006) 
examined the cross-cultural construct equivalence of corporate reputation in six countries: 
Australia, Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and the U.K. Despite construct 
equivalency of corporate reputation across countries, she found differences in antecedents 
and consequences of reputation in those countries. For instance, profitability has a more 
salient role in forming firm reputations in Australia and the Netherlands, where a 
company could not have a good reputation if it was not profitable (Gardberg, 2006). 
Institutional differences can influence both external observers who evaluate 
companies and organizational members who determine firm practices and strategies. 
Corporate reputation is formed based on the relationship and interaction between the firm 
and its observers in their shared institutional environment (Goode, 1978). Observers 
evaluate a firm based on its congruence to socially constructed standards and criteria that 
are context-specific rather than universal (Love & Kraatz, 2009; Rao, 1994; Staw & 
Epstein, 2000). Firms and observers are embedded in a cultural system (Rao, 1994) and 
thus form a mutual understanding about local standards, expectations, and beliefs about 
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which business practices are legitimate and desirable (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). 
Organizational reputation can be viewed as the shared cognitive representations of an 
organization held by its stakeholders (Fombrun, 1996; Grunig & Hung, 2002). Thus, 
inhabitants of a country construct elaborate cognitive schema, or mental maps, which are 
influenced by shared socio-cultural and institutional settings and are different from those 
of people in other countries. One of the manifestations of these differences is found in 
people’s perceptions of corporations and their evaluations of corporate reputation. 
Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance scholars frequently trace the origin of their field back to 
Berle and Means’ (1932) classic book Private Property and the Modern Corporation 
(Davis, 2005). Since few investors were sufficiently large to fund the massive projects 
pursued by many U.S. corporations during the late 19th and early 20th century, 
shareholdings became disbursed. According to these authors, this lead to a system of so-
called “managerial capitalism”, where firms were owned by weak minority shareholders 
but controlled by powerful professional managers. While critics debate elements of this 
account such as the extent of unconstrained managerial power (see Davis, 2005; Mizruchi, 
2004), this emphasis on the separation of share ownership and control underscores the 
competing demands imposed on the firm and its resources. While shareholders might 
want the firm to pursue financial returns and maximize profit, managers for instance may 
place a greater value in organizational growth, stability and empire building (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  
Most corporate governance research to date has focused on threats to shareholder 
claims and interests (Davis, 2009; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Prahalad, 1994). In one 
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frequently cited definition, for instance, economists Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny 
(1997: 737) describe corporate governance as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” This emphasis is 
at least partially attributable to the notion of shareholder primacy, within which 
shareholders are viewed for all practical purposes as the owners of the firm and the rights 
of all other stakeholders are treated as subordinate. Thus, the primary objective of the 
firm should be to maximize profitability and returns to stockholders (see Friedman, 1980; 
Jensen, 2001). This ideology appears to have first gained dominance in the United States 
and other market-based economies, but observers have also chronicled its uneven 
influence in other countries (Deakin, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 
2003; Roe, 2003; Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch & McGuire, 2007). 
Some sociologists and legal scholars argue that shareholder primacy is more the 
result of political and normative influences rather than explicit legal statute (Blair & 
Stout, 1999; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Deakin (2005) points out that even United 
States corporate law does not regard shareholders as undisputed owners of the firm. The 
shareholder primacy movement has instead gained dominance due to actions of a broad 
coalition of activists with common interests who were able to assert their legal rights 
(Davis & Thompson, 1994). Despite the traditional emphasis in the corporate governance 
literature, recent research has dedicated increasing attention to the ways that other 
constituencies influence the firm and make claims on its resources (Fiss, 2008; Freeman, 
Wicks & Parmar, 2004). O’Sullivan (2003), for instance, urges researchers to study more 
closely how labor power and preferences affect firm behavior. The comparative literature 
on corporate governance offers important insights on the various influences of the firm’s 
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diverse stakeholders (Schneper & Guillén, 2004). Countries are often characterized as 
following either a shareholder- or stakeholder-centered model of corporate governance. 
The United States and the United Kingdom are most commonly offered as examples of 
the shareholder-centered model, which is characterized by liquid capital markets, 
disbursed stockholdings and well developed markets for corporate control. Since internal 
constraints on managers, such as boards of directors, are relatively weak, investors rely 
on market-based forces to discipline and control managers (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; Guillén 2000). Accordingly, the shareholder-centered 
system is often viewed as a market-based economic system. The legal rights of 
shareholders tend to receive privilege, thus making this model consistent with the 
shareholder primacy perspective. 
By comparison, the stakeholder-centered model exhibits concentrated 
shareholdings by powerful constituents such as banks or the state, strong boards with 
representation from regulatory, creditor and labor interests, but weak stock market 
constraints on managerial behavior. The stakeholder-centered corporate governance 
model is often referred to as a bank-based economic system. According to the 
stakeholder-centered model, the corporation tends to be viewed less as property and more 
as a public entity with a broad range of responsibilities to creditors, workers, the public 
and others (see Allen, 1992). Such values are upheld by broader legal rights and 
protections to these stakeholder groups (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Roe, 2003). While 
Germany and Japan are the most frequently cited cases of the stakeholder-centered 
approach, it is important to note that both corporate governance models are ideal types 
and there is considerable diversity across countries. Even though the U.S. and U.K. 
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systems are closely associated for instance, most comparative researchers agree that 
workers receive significantly weaker legal protection in the former (Schneper & Guillén, 
2004).  
The study of national legal institutions has proven to be an especially fruitful way 
of exploring variations in corporate governance and stakeholder power. La Porta and 
colleagues (1998) tested the effect of legal origins on shareholder protections in 49 
countries. They identified four legal origins for commercial laws: common law (England 
and British former colonies such as Australia, Canada, India, and the US), French civil 
law (Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and countries under their colonial 
influence), German civil law (Austria, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Korea, and Switzerland), 
and Scandinavian civil law (four Nordic countries). They argued that shareholders seek 
power and control in the organization to influence decision-making and protect their 
interests. Common law countries were found to provide the best shareholder protection, 
whereas Scandinavian, German and French civil law provided progressively weaker 
protections. Consistent with their arguments, they found that ownership tends to be more 
concentrated in countries with weaker shareholder protections (i.e., civil law countries). 
Political differences across countries are another source of corporate governance 
diversity. Vitols (2001) examined the political ideology of state elites in the 1930s and 
1940s, particularly their views about state intervention in business affairs and the role of 
financial markets in the achievement of economic and social goals. Critical of market 
capitalism, German and Japanese state elites created a regulatory regime that favored 
banks over markets in the financial system whereas American state elites maintained a 
liberal approach in regulating financial markets. The bank-based system was regarded as 
57 
a better fit by Japanese state elites who regarded financial systems as a “national resource” 
for promoting economic growth. 
STAKEHOLDER POWER, CORPORATE REPUTATION AND THE 
CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
In an influential article, financial economist Michael Jensen (2001) proposed that 
corporate performance should be evaluated by the extent that firms achieve their 
fundamental goal, or corporate objective function. Jensen argued that the only 
economically justifiable objective for business corporations was shareholder value 
maximization. By contrast, many comparative corporate governance scholars argue that 
beliefs about corporate objectives are not so much universal and rationally determined as 
they are context-specific and socially constructed (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). Powerful 
stakeholders groups play a critical role in shaping beliefs about the types of corporate 
behaviors and goals deemed legitimate and favored by society (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). 
Accordingly, we propose that societal members evaluate corporations based on these 
subjective expectations and that the firms that perform best according to these standards 
achieve superior reputations.  
The notion that powerful societal elites help shape societal values and beliefs is 
not new. Mills (1956) suggested that society’s “power elite” controlled public opinion in 
part through its influence over intellectuals, mass media, and educational institutions. 
From a Weberian perspective (1978), the state serves as a source of rational-legal or 
traditional authority. When a county’s legal system favors one constituency over another, 
the claims of this group are deemed legitimate. Stakeholders with greater legal 
protections are also able to participate more directly in the governance of the firm 
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(Schneper & Guillén, 2004). Managers will communicate their organizations’ actions, 
strategies and outcomes using language and rhetoric that are consistent with these 
stakeholders’ preferences (Fiss & Zajac, 2004), which further affects public opinion.  
 In our first three hypotheses, we examine the direct impacts of firms’ financial 
performance (via stock market returns and financial performance stability) and social 
performance on reputational evaluations within society in order to disentangle the 
multiple impacts of firm performance on reputation. We suggest that these firm attributes 
are valued by a broad range of constituencies across countries. Most stakeholder groups 
tend to favor firms that are financially vigorous and act responsibly, even if they place a 
different priority on each of these objectives. In our final three hypotheses, we suggest 
that the comparative importance of financial and social performance to reputational 
assessment depends on the allocation of power and legal rights within society. In 
particular, we examine the rights and preferences of shareholders, creditors and labor 
since these stakeholders are most frequently cited for their varying levels of influence 
across countries and because of their comparatively direct claim on the firm’s resources 
(see Schneper & Guillén, 2004). We hypothesize moderating relationships based upon 
the protection of shareholder rights, creditor rights and labor rights, and how these 
protections might differentially impact different performance measures. 
Financial and Social Performance 
Financial performance information reflects a firm’s success in past strategies, 
effectiveness in resource allocation, and fulfillment of its missions and goals. Although 
stakeholders place different expectations on the firm, strong financial performance is in 
part the consequence of satisfying these diverse objectives (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
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Waddock & Graves, 1997; Walsh, Weber & Margolis, 2003). To enhance their power 
and status, managers need legitimacy, trust, esteem, and admiration of shareholders, 
creditors, and other stakeholders that requires attention to financial outcomes. The 
relationship between financial performance and corporate reputation has been 
documented previously (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Regardless of the country context, 
the business corporation is fundamentally a commercial endeavor. Shareholders, creditors, 
employees and other stakeholders all benefit albeit unequally from their relationships 
with firms that perform well financially.  
While it follows that stakeholders will evaluate strong market performers 
favorably, it is important to consider the multifaceted nature of financial performance 
(Meyer, 1994). A firm’s financial performance may appear dramatically different 
depending on the timeframe and type of measurement employed (see McGuire, 
Schneeweis, & Hill, 1986). Shareholders are most likely to judge firms based on their 
stock market returns. However, the relevance of stock market performance to reputational 
assessment is not limited to shareholders. Strong stock market performance enhances a 
firm’s prominence to creditors, potential employees and other stakeholders. Banks and 
other lenders for instance associate stock returns with a firm’s ability to raise capital. 
According to Fligstein (1990, 2001), business discourse and beliefs in the U.S and many 
other countries have become dominated by a paradigm he terms as the finance conception 
of control. Fligstein and his proponents suggest this conception of control has evolved 
into a system where share price is considered the purest measure of a firm’s value (Davis, 
2009; Davis & Stout, 1992). Accordingly, “firms are viewed as collections of assets 
earning different rates of return, not as producers of given goods” (Fligstein, 1990: 15). 
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Another aspect of financial performance that might have an important impact on 
firm reputation involves the degree of financial stability (Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 
2010; McGahan & Porter, 1999). While observers may laud a firm’s recent market results, 
companies that have achieved sustained financial success are likely to be held in higher 
esteem. Firms with volatile earnings will be more likely to be viewed as risky. The 
general public and resource-providers are generally risk averse (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990) and therefore favor more financially stable firms. Organization theory suggests that 
firms will be deemed more legitimate if their actions are consistent and predictable 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Suchman, 1995), which would likely lead to higher 
reputation assessments. Additionally, consistency and predictability lowers information 
asymmetry between a firm and its stakeholders. This allows stakeholders to have better 
knowledge about the true attributes of the firm. Gardberg and Newburry (2010) found 
that people with greater knowledge about a firm were less likely to punish the firm via 
boycott for negative attributes. Thus, while greater knowledge could include negative 
elements, to the extent that financial stability leads to greater knowledge, it may be 
correlated with higher reputation perceptions. 
Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypotheses associated with 
financial performance: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship between stock market returns and 
corporate reputation. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between financial performance 
stability and corporate reputation. 
Corporate social performance (CSP) refers to the extent to which a firm’s actions 
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attend to the needs and interests of stakeholders beyond simply its investors (Waddock & 
Graves, 1997). Examples include community spending, voluntary community 
engagement, transparency in both financial and social behavior, enactment of employee 
safety, health, and training policies, complying with equal employment opportunity, and 
adopting environmental standards. From an economic perspective, CSP reduces the 
uncertainty caused by information asymmetries between competing firms and their 
stakeholders (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). To reduce uncertainty, 
stakeholders search for information that reveals the true attributes of competing firms. 
From this perspective, tangible organizational outputs such as strong financial results are 
specific attributes that lead to positive evaluations of organizational reputation (Love & 
Kraatz, 2009; Rindova et al., 2005; Shapiro, 1982, 1983). Signaling theory suggests that 
socially responsible firms can help observers distinguish themselves from competing 
firms. As a result, observers learn more about the firms’ other attributes (Spence, 1973).  
From an institutional perspective, attitudes towards CSP are a collective 
perception (Fombrun, 1996). Observers evaluate firm behaviors as symbolic indicators of 
their conformity and fitness with society’s norms and cultural beliefs (Love & Kraatz, 
2009). In a study of bandwagon effects of popular managerial fads (e.g., total quality 
management), Staw and Epstein (2000) found that while adoption provided no 
discernible economic gain, corporate reputations improved due to their conformity with 
beliefs about best practices. As countless observers have noted, firms across countries are 
confronted with growing normative pressures to act in a socially responsible manner 
(Campbell, 2007). Thus, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a positive relationship between corporate social 
62 
performance and corporate reputation. 
Stakeholder Power 
Collective perceptions about the firm are influenced by information sent and 
received (Gardberg, 2006). Firms and other influential groups including the media, 
governmental and non-governmental agencies all participate in the production and 
dissemination of this information. However, personal assumptions, cognitive schema and 
societal expectations serve to filter and interpret this information. One of the underlying 
factors that affect both the information sent and received is the context and environment 
in which organizations operate and observers reside. Companies try to adapt to their 
unique environments resulting in variations in firm behavior across domains (Selznick, 
1949). In other words, a firm’s actions, strategies, goals, and even the type of information 
disclosed are chosen so as to conform to the formal and informal requirements of its 
environment. According to Trevino (1986: 612), “collective norms about what is and 
what is not appropriate behavior are shared and are used to guide behavior. . . . These 
help individuals judge both what is right and who is responsible in a particular situation”. 
Consequently, reputational assessment and mechanisms through which observers trust, 
admire, and respect firms vary across countries.  
Social elites possess significant influence on the type of information disseminated 
in a society as well as the establishment of shared norms and beliefs. Each country’s 
institutional environment, including its legal system, serves to define property rights, 
governance structures and set expectations on how the firm and its constituencies ought 
to interact with one another (Campbell, 2007; Fligstein, 2001). A stakeholder power 
perspective thus suggests that differences in norms and collective beliefs are shaped 
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largely by power dynamics, which tend to be highly institutionalized and resistant to 
substantial change (Davis & Marquis, 2005). Following Schneper and Guillén (2004), we 
focus on the following three stakeholders: shareholders, creditors (commercial banks), 
and labor. We consider how power in the form of rights protections for these three key 
stakeholder groups interacts with specific performance measures (stock market returns, 
financial performance stability and social performance) to influence corporate reputation 
assessments within a society.  
Shareholder rights protection. Fligstein (2001) contends that in market-oriented 
countries, owners of firms will try to capture economic rents by limiting direct 
government intervention and regulatory oversight. Capitalist interests prevent state-
ownership, and shareholders rights receive privilege since property rights and the concept 
of ownership are held as paramount. The dominance by capitalist elites creates a 
shareholding culture and engages all actors in the society (Davis, 2009). Consequently, 
firms, media, and third parties disseminate more information about share performance, 
and individuals are more motivated to follow or attend to this information. In sum, in 
societies where capitalists are the dominant power, stock performance is a more salient 
dimension of firm reputation than in countries where other social groups have dominant 
power. Therefore, we suggest that: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): In countries with strong shareholder rights protections, stock market 
returns have a relatively more positive influence on the public’s assessment of corporate 
reputation than in markets where these protections are weaker. 
Creditor rights protection. While creditors such as commercial banks also 
possess a financial stake in the corporation, their objectives and expectations are much 
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different from shareholders. Unlike shareholders, creditors do not benefit from the 
residual claims of the corporation. The promised return to creditors is more or less fixed 
or contractually prescribed. Except in cases of corporate insolvency, a creditor’s ability to 
influence management and exercise control over the firm is also much weaker than that 
of a shareholder (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Corporate governance scholars tend to 
characterize bank-centered economies as more long-term oriented (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003; Fligstein, 2001; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). Banks in certain countries serve as 
major shareholders, but in these cases the banks tend to be more interested in developing 
long-term commercial ties with the firm rather than seeking gains from share appreciation 
(Fligstein, 2001; Schneper & Guillén, 2004). For these reasons, creditors tend to favor 
stability and consistency in firms over maximizing share price. 
Due to a lack of well-developed capital markets in bank-centered economies, 
banks are the major source of capital for firms. According to resource dependence theory, 
companies attend most to the demands of organizations that control their critical 
resources (Pfeffer, 1981). In bank-centered economies, firms are heavily dependent on 
banks for capital, an essential resource for their survival. This dependence gives banks an 
opportunity to control firms. Therefore, firms must manage these critical relationships by 
complying with bank goals and objectives. Additionally, unlike dispersed share 
ownership in market-based systems, in bank-centered economies, banks have large stakes 
in companies and have power to closely monitor and control companies. Assembling the 
prior arguments suggests that institutional pressures in bank-based financial systems tend 
to be more long-term oriented and favor more stable financial performance. Therefore, 
we hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 5 (H5): In countries with strong creditor protections, financial stability has a 
relatively more positive influence on the public’s assessment of corporate reputation than 
in markets where these protections are weaker. 
Labor rights protection. In societies where worker groups are relatively 
powerful, governments have a greater capacity for intervening directly in product and 
labor markets, and policy domains seek to protect workers and jobs to a greater degree 
(Fligstein, 2001). There are extensive work rules, welfare, unemployment, and health and 
safety benefits in these societies (Fligstein, 2001). State ownership is prevalent and the 
level of direct involvement of the state varies depending on the relative power of labor 
and firms (Fligstein, 2001). In labor disputes, the state frequently sides with worker 
groups over firms (Fligstein, 2001). Labor laws provide a mechanism for workers to 
influence organizational decision making. From a social movement perspective, workers 
can influence companies through collective actions (King, 2008). Labor laws provide 
capacity for development of formal organizations and interpersonal networks, which are 
instrumental in forming a mobilizing structure for collective actions (King, 2008). One of 
these mechanisms is freedom of association. Union rights allow labor to establish formal 
organizations to pursue their claims in a planned, organized, and powerful manner. In 
addition, formal labor unions not only lower starting costs, but also strengthen the 
interpersonal networks and interaction among workers and assist them in developing 
similar interests and identities (King, 2008). Another mechanism is representation rights. 
Strong representation rights provide labor with legal rights to information, consultation, 
and codetermination in key decisions (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Employee 
participation in decision making changes the shareholder supremacy model to a more 
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stakeholder approach by bringing interests of other stakeholders, particularly the long-
term needs of society, into consideration. In other words, the presence of employees in 
decision making may cause companies to take more responsibility toward society through 
good governance, human rights, and the environmental consequences of their activities. 
To the extent that the employee promotes community and labor interests, we can expect 
that firms will face greater pressures to pursue social responsibility. Therefore, we 
propose: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): In countries with strong labor rights protections, corporate social 
performance has a relatively more positive influence on the public’s assessment of 
corporate reputation than in markets where these protections are weaker. 
METHODS 
Setting and Data 
The unit of analysis in our study is the firm. We used a sample of corporate 
reputation data collected by the Reputation Institute as part of their 2009 RepTrack Pulse 
study (Reputation Institute, 2009). The Reputation Institute conducted a cross-country 
survey examining the general public’s reputational assessments of the 600 largest 
companies in the world (based on revenue) along with 750 additional companies to 
balance the sample in terms of industry and country comparisons. Since the general 
public is likely to evaluate foreign and domestic companies differently (Newburry, 
Gardberg & Belkin, 2006), we excluded reputational assessments of subsidiaries of 
foreign companies. Thus, each country was evaluated only by members of the general 
public from its home country. After further elimination due to lack of data, our final 
sample size became 756 companies from 33 countries. All explanatory and control 
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variables were lagged one year. 
Dependent Variable 
The Reputation Institute administered a multi-item online survey measuring the 
perceptions of individuals from the general public on different aspects of corporate 
reputation. While prior research on corporate reputation tends to rely on the perceptions 
of a narrowly defined group (such as shareholders, managers, or market analysts), this 
measure is notable since it is derived from broader public attitudes. More than 115,000 
respondents from 33 countries who have at least minimal familiarity with a focal 
company were selected to participate in the study. In order to be selected, a respondent 
was required to answer 3 out of 4 screening questions about the company (Asher, 2004). 
In addition, respondents were chosen to represent the general population of their 
countries based on gender and age. Surveys were conducted in the local language to 
prevent biases associated with an English-only questionnaire (Harzing, 2005). 
Questionnaires were translated and back translated by professionals fluent in English and 
the local language to ensure accuracy. The four items composing the index are (1) “good 
overall reputation”, (2) “a company I have a good feeling about”,  (3) “a company that I 
trust”, and (4) “a company that I admire and respect” (Reputation Institute, 2009). Prior 
research findings suggest that items measuring general perceptions have greater face 
validity across cultures than more specific and culturally derived items (Scandura, 
Williams, & Hamilton, 2001). Respondents evaluated each item on a 7-point scale, where 
“1” indicates “strongly disagree” and “7” indicates “strongly agree”. Respondents also 
had the option to indicate “not sure”. The scale Chronbach Alpha is 0.988. Since 
interpretation of items can vary across cultures (Gardberg, 2006), their factor structure 
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was evaluated in each country and found to be equivalent. LISREL analyses confirmed 
the unidimensionality, convergent validity, and fit of the scale items. A company’s 
reputation score is calculated using the average of the scores of all respondents evaluating 
a particular company within a country, and then converted to a 0 – 100 scale for ease of 
interpretation.  
Independent Variables 
Firm financial data was gathered from the Bloomberg (2010) database. Stock 
market returns are commonly considered the firm financial performance measure most 
closely associated with the shareholder value paradigm (Fligstein, 1990). Thus, we 
measured financial performance by using each firm’s three-year cumulative total return. 
Cumulative total returns account for both stock price changes and disbursements to 
shareholders by assuming that cash dividends are reinvested on the ex-date (Bloomberg, 
2010). Results were materially the same in supplemental tests using one- and five-year 
total return measures. To construct our measure of financial stability (H2), we adopted a 
standard proxy of financial risk by calculating the variance of each firm’s return on assets 
(ROA) from 2000 to 2008 (Thomsen & Rose, 2004). We multiplied this score by “-1” so 
that higher scores represent greater stability.  
An ideal corporate social performance measure would be based on the direct 
observation of the firm and its various human, environmental and societal relationships 
(Wood, 2007). To our knowledge, however, no adequate measure of this nature exists for 
a sample of firms across a large number of countries. We thus focused on each firm’s 
social reporting and participation in key voluntary CSR initiatives, i.e., U.N. Global 
Compact (UNGC) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Business ethicists often 
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contend that transparency and stakeholder engagement are essential elements of strong 
social performance (Scherer & Palazzo, 2008). Since our focus in this paper is on public 
perceptions of the firm, CSR reporting and participation in voluntary initiatives are 
particularly relevant since they provide a highly visible signal of the firm’s espoused 
commitment to CSR. We collected data from three sources, namely, UNGC, GRI, and 
Bloomberg, and combined them to create our own measure of social performance 
reporting. UNGC and GRI are probably the most often noted global voluntary initiatives 
for their role in setting CSR engagement and reporting standards (see, e.g., Hess, 2008; 
Runhaar & Lafferty, 2009). The UNGC framework includes 10 principles in the areas of 
human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption. Similar to UNGC, GRI requires 
companies to report on the impact of their activities in the areas of environment, human 
rights, society, and product responsibility. We also examined transparency and disclosure 
data from the Bloomberg database. Bloomberg reviews environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) disclosures of companies (e.g., code of ethics, health and safety policy, 
human right policy, equal employment policy, fair remuneration policy, among others) 
and assigns an ESG Disclosure score to them. Combining the above information, we 
constructed a binary variable that equals “1” if the company participates in UNGC or 
GRI, or if its Bloomberg ESG Disclosure score is better than 75% of the companies in the 
sample. Since UNGC, GRI and the Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores include a strong 
labor component, firms must demonstrate a strong commitment to labor to achieve a 
positive score in our measure.  
We measured the strength of shareholder rights (H4) using the “antidirector 
rights index” originally developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
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(1998). This index reflects the level of minority shareholder rights protection against 
expropriation by corporate insiders. A country’s score can theoretically range from zero 
to six based on the presence or absence of six representative shareholder rights provisions, 
such as  the ability for shareholders to vote cumulatively for board members and the 
existence of a legal mechanism for shareholders to challenge actions by management. 
(See Armour, Deakin, Lele & Simms, 2009 for a recent discussion.) Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) updated the original index and expanded coverage 
from 49 to 72 countries. We use the revised index in our analysis.  
To evaluate the effects of creditor rights (H5), we adopted Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine’s (2008) four-point Bank Ownership index. Banks have a more limited influence 
on the national economy and corporate governance in countries which scored “1” where 
“banks may not acquire any equity investment in a nonfinancial firm” or “2” where 
“banks can only acquire less than 100% of the equity in a nonfinancial firm”. On the 
other hand, banks have a more central role in a national economy and corporate 
governance in countries which scored “3”, meaning “banks may own 100% of the equity 
in a nonfinancial firm, but ownership is limited based on a bank’s equity capital” or “4” 
meaning “banks may own 100% of the equity in any nonfinancial firm”. 
Our labor rights (H6) measure was based on Botero, Djandov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004), which investigated the regulation of labor markets in 85 
countries from three broad areas: employment, collective relations, and social security 
laws. For each of the areas, they examined the formal legal statutes governing labor 
markets and constructed an index within which higher values correspond to more legal 
protection for employees in that area. We aggregated these three indices to measure labor 
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rights protection in this study. 
Control Variables 
We controlled for country-, industry-, and firm-level factors that might have 
effects on individual perceptions about corporations. At the country level, we controlled 
for cultural, political, and economic factors. Word of mouth, the availability of multiple 
options and the possibility of comparing them, autonomy to make decisions, and national 
pride are factors that influence individuals’ perceptions about local firms (Fombrun, 1996; 
Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Gardberg, 2001). Therefore, we controlled for the level of 
trust, national pride, autonomy, and freedom of choice index scores from the World 
Value Survey 2009 (World Value Survey, 2009). We also controlled for level of 
democracy (Polity IV database; Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2010) and government 
accountability in each country (World Bank’s World Governance Indicator). Furthermore, 
we controlled for economic development (GDP per capita), economic globalization, 
which leads to presence of foreign firms and participation of local firms in the global 
economy (FDI/GDP), and market capitalization.  
Past studies show that industry reputation influences perceptions of companies 
(Winn, MacDonald, & Ziestsma, 2008). Companies in our sample cover 25 industries and 
we controlled for industry effects by defining dummy variables for each industry 
(telecom is the excluded variable). In addition, past studies suggest that firm visibility 
and history affect corporate reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990) and therefore, we 
controlled for company size (Revenue) and age.  
Estimation Method 
Since our dependent variable (RepTrack Pulse scores) is an index ranging from 0 
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to 100, ordinary least squares regression is not appropriate (OLS). Under conditions 
where the dependent variable is censored, OLS produces parameter estimates that are 
inconsistent (Long, 2005). Therefore, we used the Tobit regression model (Tobin, 1958) 
which is designed to produce consistent parameter estimates in cases of limited, or 
censored dependent variables (see also Amemiya, 1984).  
RESULTS 
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for our measures. It 
shows that some of the country-level controls have moderate levels of correlation 
(between 0.35 and 0.65) and two correlations are above the commonly used cut-off of 0.7 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). High correlations are reported between democracy and 
government accountability as well as economic development and market capitalization. 
Collinearity diagnosis indicated that the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) is 2.98 and 
all individual scores are below 4.00, which is below the commonly used threshold of 10 
(see Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998), except for the above mentioned four 
variables. In order to better understand the effect of these correlations on our results, we 
ran our analyses two times. In the first run, we included all variables, and in the second 
we excluded democracy and market capitalization. Excluding these two measures, there 
were no individual VIFs above 4.00 and no evidence that multicollinearity was a problem. 
Results of these two runs were highly consistent with the results reported below, with the 
exception that the significance level for H6 was slightly over marginal significance 
(p=.14). Results were also robust when we attempted model specifications with 
alternative or fewer country-level controls. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Corporate Reputation 65.43 10.67 14.00 91.34  
2 Trusting People 1.65 0.12 1.30 1.94 0.05  
3 National Pride 1.63 0.30 1.16 2.30 -0.13* -0.10* 
4 Autonomy Index 0.79 0.19 0.33 1.18 -0.22* -0.41* 0.61*
5 Freedom of Choice 7.07 0.59 5.67 7.74 0.04 -0.14* -0.58* -0.25*
6 Democracy 8.35 4.29 -7.00 10.00 -0.32* 0.28* -0.25* -0.13* 0.09*
7 Gov. Accountability 0.85 0.83 -1.68 1.59 -0.42* 0.11* -0.18* -0.04 0.19* 0.92*
8 Globalization 6.28 4.52 -2.45 25.59 -0.19* -0.01 0.14* -0.13* 0.03 0.07* 0.26*
9 Economic Development 4643.37 5413.47 170.86 48706.88 0.06 -0.12* -0.39* -0.02 0.46* 0.09* 0.06 -0.27*
10 Market Capitalization 333644.00 437855.70 4913.75 1173810.00 0.09* -0.12* -0.45* -0.07 0.51* 0.12* 0.09* -0.26* 0.94*
11 Company Size (Sales) 29309.37 43843.85 -58601.00 458361.00 -0.14* 0.05 0.09* 0.14* 0.00 0.12* 0.13* 0.01 0.19* 0.18*
12 Company Age -0.22 54.99 -61.14 473.86 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.21* 0.22* 0.03 0.10* 0.08*
13 Shareholder Rights 0.00 1.13 -2.57 1.43 -0.15* 0.30* -0.08* -0.11* -0.16* 0.50* 0.43* 0.16* -0.26* -0.25*
14 Creditor Rights 0.00 0.85 -1.61 1.39 -0.29* 0.35* -0.01 -0.22* 0.04 0.46* 0.48* 0.28* -0.40* -0.40*
15 Labor Rights 0.00 0.37 -0.39 0.75 -0.16* -0.02 0.53* 0.23* -0.41* -0.08* -0.05 0.16* -0.52* -0.58*
16 Stock Market Returns -0.07 64.44 -92.56 760.58 0.19* -0.08* 0.11* 0.05 0.02 -0.34* -0.29* -0.02 -0.05 -0.06
17 Financial Stability -0.18 88.05 -1109.19 26.92 0.08* 0.08* 0.06 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01
18 Corp. Social Performance 0.00 0.50 -0.53 0.47 -0.11* 0.11* 0.13* 0.08* -0.15* 0.26* 0.28* 0.09* -0.07 -0.09*
 
 Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
12 Company Age 0.05
13 Shareholder Rights 0.00 0.04
14 Creditor Rights -0.01 0.01 0.54*
15 Labor Rights 0.02 0.00 -0.20* 0.08*
16 Stock Market Returns 0.00 -0.11* -0.16* -0.15* 0.04
17 Financial Stability 0.10* 0.09* -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.07*
18 Corp. Social Performance 0.24* 0.14* 0.20* 0.20* 0.17* -0.09* 0.03
*: p<0.05 
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Table 2.2 presents Tobit regression results for corporate reputation and includes 
six models. All models include our full sample of 756 firms from 25 industries across 33 
countries. Each model also demonstrates a highly significant likelihood ratio (p<0.001) 
suggesting a good fit. Model 1 includes just control variables and serves as a baseline. 
Model 2 incorporates the direct effect variables, namely financial performance, financial 
stability, and corporate social performance. The results provide positive and significant 
support for the effects of financial performance (p<0.01), financial stability (p<0.05), and 
corporate social performance (p<0.01) on corporate reputation, thus supporting H1- H3.  
Models 3 – 5 report the results for our hypothesized interaction effects. Model 3 
adds the interaction between shareholder rights protection and financial performance, 
with a significant positive coefficient (p<0.05), implying greater importance of financial 
performance in countries where the legal system provides more protection to 
shareholders. Thus, we find support for H4. Model 4 adds the hypothesized interaction 
between creditor rights protection and financial stability to Model 2 to test H5. The result 
is significant, but not in the expected direction. Therefore, H5 was not supported. Testing 
H6, Model 5 adds the interaction between labor rights protection and social performance 
and finds a significant effect (p<.05). Thus, we find support for H6.  
Model 6 presents our full model with all controls, direct effects and all three 
interactions. This model reports results that are similar to our previous models, further 
demonstrating the robustness of the findings. Overall, all three of our direct effect 
hypotheses and two of our interaction hypotheses were supported, with our third 
interaction variable (creditor rights) being significant in the opposite direction to our 
expectations. 
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Table 2.2: Tobit Regression Results for Corporate Reputation 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variable H Control Model Direct Effects Shareholder Rights Creditor Rights Labor Rights Full Model 
Controls:        
Trusting People  3.603 (3.20) 1.904 (3.17) 1.214 (3.17) 1.500 (3.15) 1.258 (3.18) 0.175 (3.16) 
National Pride  0.652 (1.87) 0.272 (1.84) 0.224 (1.83) 0.153 (1.83) 0.670 (1.85) 0.496 (1.83) 
Autonomy Index  -12.858*** (2.35) -12.774*** (2.32) -12.464*** (2.31) -12.689*** (2.31) -12.971*** (2.32) -12.570*** (2.29) 
Freedom of Choice  1.892* (0.79) 2.023* (0.79) 1.945* (0.79) 2.237** (0.79) 2.132** (0.79) 2.263** (0.79) 
Democracy  0.613* (0.26) 0.819** (0.27) 0.751** (0.27) 0.869** (0.26) 0.910*** (0.27) 0.889*** (0.27) 
Gov. Accountability  -7.622*** (1.32) -8.530*** (1.32) -8.467*** (1.32) -8.736*** (1.31) -9.078*** (1.35) -9.208*** (1.33) 
Globalization  -0.125 (0.09) -0.100 (0.08) -0.114 (0.08) -0.094 (0.08) -0.100 (0.08) -0.107 (0.08) 
Econ. Development a  -0.000+ (0.00) -0.000* (0.00) -0.000* (0.00) -0.000* (0.00) -0.000* (0.00) -0.000* (0.00) 
Market Capitalization  0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 
Shareholder Rights (SR)  0.543 (0.40) 0.376 (0.40) 0.324 (0.40) 0.463 (0.40) 0.329 (0.40) 0.363 (0.40) 
Creditor Rights (CR)  -2.679*** (0.54) -2.574*** (0.54) -2.468*** (0.54) -2.691*** (0.54) -2.530*** (0.54) -2.540*** (0.53) 
Labor Rights (LR)  -2.705* (1.25) -3.183* (1.25) -3.406** (1.25) -2.934* (1.24) -3.811** (1.28) -3.775** (1.28) 
Industry Dummies  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Company Size a  -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000+ (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000+ (0.00) -0.000+ (0.00) 
Company Age  0.014* (0.01) 0.012* (0.01) 0.012* (0.01) 0.012* (0.01) 0.012* (0.01) 0.012* (0.01) 
Direct effects:        
Stock Market Returns H1  0.014** (0.01) 0.020*** (0.01) 0.014** (0.01) 0.014** (0.01) 0.020*** (0.01) 
Financial Stability H2  0.008* (0.00) 0.008* (0.00) 0.012** (0.00) 0.008* (0.00) 0.011** (0.00) 
Corp. Social Perf. H3  2.042** (0.66) 2.032** (0.66) 2.099** (0.66) 2.188*** (0.66) 2.232*** (0.66) 
Interaction terms:        
SR x Stock Mkt. Returns H4   0.008* (0.00)     0.008* (0.00) 
CR x Fin. Stability H5     -0.011** (0.00)   -0.011** (0.00) 
LR x Social Perf. H6       3.411* (1.69) 3.340* (1.68) 
        
Constant  54.006*** (9.25) 55.186*** (9.15) 57.200*** (9.15) 54.263*** (9.10) 54.690*** (9.13) 55.813*** (9.08) 
Observations (firms)  756  756 756  756 756 756  
Number of countries  33  33 33  33 33 33  
Number of industries  25  25 25  25 25 25  
Likelihood Ratio Chi2  480.27***  504.99***  511.10***  514.35***  509.04***  524.56***  
a: Coefficient multiplied by 1000; Tobit regression Coefficient (Standard errors); *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Drawing on insights from the corporate governance and stakeholder power 
literatures, this study investigated differences in the reputational assessments of 
corporations across countries. The results are consistent with the image of the firm as a 
political contest where powerful actors help generate and foster national beliefs about the 
role of the business corporation in society (Fligstein, 2001; Perrow. 1986). These beliefs 
in turn assist in determining the types of firms that enjoy superior reputations. Consistent 
with past studies, the results demonstrate the positive impact of both financial 
performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Gabbioneta et al., 2007) and social 
performance (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Schwaiger, 2004) on corporate reputation. The 
results also demonstrated that the diversity of reputed firms across countries can be 
linked to national differences in stakeholder power and corporate governance practices. 
The analysis showed that in countries where shareholder rights are privileged, stock 
market return has a greater weight in forming public perceptions about companies. In 
addition, in countries where labor rights are more protected, corporate social performance 
has an increased role in determining corporate reputation. Contrary to our expectations, 
we also found that when creditors have greater power, the influence of financial stability 
on reputation assessment becomes weaker. 
Examining our individual results, this study shows that both short-term stock 
market returns and financial stability positively influence a public’s perception of firms. 
Stock price is a simple and easy to communicate signal (see, e.g., Spence, 1973) that 
reflects important information and expectations about the firm. On the other hand, 
financial stability may be regarded by certain audiences as a more reliable indication of 
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an effective business model and better overall fit between resources and strategies. 
Therefore, these expectations about future firm performance create trust and admiration 
in the eyes of observers and lead them to form positive opinions about firms.  
Similar to financial performance, strong corporate social performance provides 
signals that make the general public more aware of the favorable attributes of the firm. 
The general public expects firms to be aligned with society’s normative values and 
cultural beliefs (Love & Kraatz, 2009) and act responsibly toward its stakeholders. Given 
the difficulties of measuring social performance in a global setting, we developed a new 
measure focusing on transparency and engagement, two aspects of corporate social 
responsibility highly relevant to the drivers of positive corporate reputation. Our results 
show that greater transparency and engagement by firms contributes to more favorable 
evaluations from society. Overall, our direct effect results demonstrate three distinct 
avenues by which firm performance influences firm reputation. While financial and 
social performance have been examined in past research (e.g., Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; 
Gabbioneta et al., 2007), we extend previous research by distinguishing two important 
types of financial performance along with examining these financial performance types 
alongside social performance to better appreciate the individual contribution of each.  
Confirming stakeholder power arguments (e.g., Schneper & Guillén, 2004), our 
results demonstrated that the diversity of reputed firms across countries can be linked to 
differences in powerful stakeholders and corporate governance systems. The analysis 
showed that in countries where shareholder rights are more protected, stock market 
returns have more weight in influencing the public’s perceptions about companies. In 
other words, in societies where the policy domain is designed to favor shareholders, 
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shareholder wealth maximization plays an even greater role in determining corporate 
reputation. This finding provides important insights about the relationship between 
financial performance and reputation, which has generally examined the impact of 
financial performance in single country settings (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
 We achieved unexpected results for countries where bank/creditor rights are 
strongly protected. We argued that in societies where creditor rights are strong, financial 
stability would have a relatively more positive influence on the public’s assessment of 
corporate reputation than in markets where these protections are weaker. However, our 
results showed that financial stability over time was significantly negatively related to 
corporate reputation assessments in countries where creditor rights are more protected. 
One potential explanation for this result involves our use of the world’s largest 
companies for our sample. These firms are more likely to possess the political and 
financial resources necessary to shield themselves during economic downturns. Creditors 
might prefer customers with these types of resources to be more dynamic and aggressive 
in growing their businesses. By contrast, creditors might view financial stability to be 
more critical for smaller, less established firms.  
Finally, the results supported our prediction about societies where labor rights 
receive privilege. We argued that in societies with stronger labor rights protection, a 
firm’s social performance would have an important influence on the general public’s 
perception of the firm. Results confirmed that social performance disclosure has a direct 
positive effect on the public’s perceptions when employees can influence or participate in 
firm decision making processes. This is consistent with Apéria et al.’s (2004) study on 
reputations of companies in the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and 
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Sweden, where they found that over 90 percent of the general public in those countries 
expect companies to be socially responsible. In contrast, Maignan and Ralston (2002) 
argue that in countries where the state has traditionally been responsible for the social 
welfare of society, the firm’s role in corporate social responsibility is narrowly defined 
and limited to good working conditions for employees (Weaver, 2001), while in countries 
where businesses have a significant role in the development of cities and communities, 
they have been assigned substantial responsibility toward the societies (Vogel, 1992). 
Our study is limited in several important ways. Although most of our country-
level variables such as cultural, political, legal, and economic variables and the dependent 
variable (perception of corporate reputation) are fairly persistent, longitudinal analysis 
could add to the strength of our arguments and results. In addition, this paper studies the 
world largest companies, which are more visible and have established reputations. Future 
research should investigate the effects of institutional context on reputation formation in 
smaller firms as well as start-up companies. This paper also highlights the need for more 
comprehensive social performance measures to compare firms at the global level.  
In addition to the contributions noted earlier, this study contributes to several 
streams of research. First, this paper is among the few studies that examine corporate 
reputation in a wide range of countries from both developed and developing economies. 
Through the use of this cross-country setting, we are able to generate important new 
insights into how national institutional differences affect the performance-reputation 
relationship. Second, this paper contributes to the field of corporate governance by 
extending the relevance of this literature to a new study domain, the area of corporate 
reputation. Our paper reaffirms the utility of conceptualizing national corporate 
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governance systems by stakeholder influence. Countries must not be segregated too 
quickly into dichotomies or other simplified categorization schemes (e.g., shareholder- 
versus stakeholder-centered models). Our analysis underscores how the use of more fine-
grained measures of stakeholder power can produce more nuanced insights. Third, our 
study contributes to the debate on convergence and the global diffusion of business 
practices (Davis & Marquis, 2005; Guillén, 2001; Weber, Davis & Lounsbury, 2009). 
Corporate governance and other practices are unlikely to converge in the foreseeable 
future since the very concept of the firm differs significantly across countries. Managers 
of multinational corporations must take power dynamics into account when operating in 
different countries in order to achieve legitimacy and strong reputations. Finally, this 
study examines reputation using a measure based on the assessments of the general 
population of a country. This differs significantly from studies that examine measures 
based on a specific segment of elite evaluators, such as financial analysts. By taking this 
approach, the study is able to better capture the effects of stakeholder power on society.  
This paper began by raising the question of “why firms exist”. Our theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence suggest that an important related question is “who 
decides why corporations exist?” While researchers might assign images to the firm that 
liken them to a “political contest”, “bundle of resources”, or “nexus of contracts”, the 
most important conceptions of the firm are probably those held by its stakeholders. For 
many shareholders, the firm may truly approximate a stream of expected future cash 
flows signified by its share price.  Banks may be more likely to regard business 
corporations as ongoing customers for a variety of financial products and services. 
Workers might view the corporation as the basis for their livelihood and more closely 
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identify with its social performance. The image that prevails ultimately depends on the 
respective power and influence of each stakeholder. Corporate reputation has roots in 
national beliefs about the role of the business corporation in society, which are 
constructed in accordance with the interests and beliefs of powerful stakeholders. 
Building on a stakeholder-power approach to corporate governance, within this 
manuscript, we investigated whether societal-level power of shareholders, creditors, and 
workers interacts with particular firm performance measures to influence reputation 
assessments of the general public. Using a sample of 756 of the largest companies in the 
world from 33 countries, our results demonstrated positive impacts of stock market 
returns, financial stability, and corporate social performance on corporate reputations. In 
addition, we provided evidence that the diversity of reputed firms across countries can be 
linked to national differences in stakeholder power and corporate governance practices. 
By doing so, we made significant contributions to both the reputation and the corporate 
governance literatures. 
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IV. ESSAY 3: 
NO SUBSTITUTE FOR EXPERIENCE? THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE 
REPUTATION ON STOCK MARKET REACTIONS TO MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
The topic of intangible assets has attracted considerable attention among scholars 
in organizational and strategy research (see Barney, 1991; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Fombrun, 1996; Pfarrer, Polluck & Rindova, 2010; Rindova, 
Williamson & Petkova, 2010). The Resource-based View (RBV) proposes that rare, 
socially complex, and difficult to imitate intangible assets significantly contribute to 
performance differences among organizations (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993; Rao, 1994). Most research in this area has focused on the effects of 
intangible assets on overall firm performance (Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; Roberts & Dowling, 2002).  By comparison, the impact of intangible assets on 
specific strategic actions remains poorly understood (Pfarrer et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
objective of this study is to advance this literature by responding to the following three 
questions: (1) Do intangible assets have a significant impact on organizational outcomes? 
(2) What is the specific impact of intangible assets on an organizational outcome? (3) Do 
intangible assets have combined impact on an organizational outcome? We intend to 
answer the above questions in the context of mergers and acquisitions (hereafter referred 
to simply as acquisition). In other words, we plan to investigate the effect of intangible 
assets on market reaction to acquisition announcements. In order to answer the first 
question, we focus on three intangible assets -- acquisition experience corporate 
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reputation and business approach toward societal responsibilities – to examine whether 
they have a significant impact on the market’s assessment of acquisition announcements. 
In the second step, we study the nature of the relationships between each of the three 
intangible assets and the market’s expectation about acquisition success. To answer the 
third question, we analyze the impact of corporate reputation on the relationship between 
acquisition experience and market reaction to acquisition announcements. 
This study contributes to the strategy literature and advances our understanding of 
intangible assets in four ways. First, confirming the RBV perspective (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991), this paper empirically shows that both action-specific 
factual and general perceptual intangible assets have a significant impact on strategic 
actions and organizational outcomes. Second, the results report that the impacts of 
intangible assets could go beyond the simple linear relation and might be in contrast to 
general opinions depending on the context of organizational practice (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). Third, the study demonstrates that companies can take advantage of 
“economies of scale” benefits of action-specific factual intangible assets and of 
“economies of scope” benefits of general perceptual intangible assets. Finally, Capron 
and Shen (2007) indicated that most of acquisition research studied only public targets. 
This research contributes by including both publically and privately held targets as well 
as disclosed and undisclosed deals. 
The study is organized in following structure. First, we review the literature on 
acquisitions and corporate reputation. Following, we develop theoretical arguments and 
propose our hypotheses. Next we describe our method and measures. We then present the 
results. In the final section, we discuss the findings, implications for managers, and 
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suggestions for future research.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Acquisition is a complex strategic action where a company (acquirer) acquires 
another company (target). It’s a non-routine event that significantly impacts functions and 
procedures in many parts of an organization (Oler, Harrison & Allen, 2008). Acquiring 
companies have different motivations for buying target firms. There is a large body of 
literature studying acquisition motives. The wide range of acquisition motivations can be 
categorized into three main groups: economic motives (short-term), strategic motives 
(long-term), and managerial self-interests (see Brouthers, van Hastenburg & van den Ven, 
1998; Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter & Davison, 2009). 
One of the main reasons for acquisitions is to enhance economic performance. 
Acquisitions can help an acquiring company enhance its economic performance through 
revenue generation, cost reduction, and risk-spreading. An acquiring firm generates new 
revenues by gaining access to new markets for its products through acquisition of a 
company operating in other locations (Dunning, 1998). Similarly, an acquiring company 
can enter into a new product market by pursuing a diversified acquisition by purchasing a 
target firm in a different industry (Rumelt, 1982). Diversified acquisition also creates new 
revenues when acquiring and target firms can combine their knowledge and technologies 
to develop new products. Particularly, managers view horizontal acquisitions as a 
strategy to redeploy resources and transfer competencies and knowledge to generate 
economies of scope (Haleblian et al., 2009). Karim and Mitchell (2000) reported that 
acquirers not only combine their resources in the areas of their strength, but also extend 
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their scope into new areas. An acquiring company can also produce revenue by acquiring 
an underperforming firm. In addition to generating new revenue, firms can improve their 
performance by reducing their costs. One strategy to reduce costs is to benefit from 
economies of scale through integrating value chain activities in acquiring and target 
companies. Combined supply orders, integrated operations, joint marketing and sales 
activities, and elimination of redundant support activities such as accounting, 
procurement, and human resources functions can significantly lower costs of the 
combined company. Furthermore, past studies have shown that an acquisition lowers cost 
through resource reconfiguration. Restructuring of assets and resources can increase 
efficiency of operations in the combined company. Similarly, acquisitions can reduce 
transaction costs. Acquiring and target companies have their own network of suppliers, 
contractors, and distributors. Bringing their social capital together lowers transaction 
costs not only with external partners, but also within their organizations. Particularly, in 
related acquisitions – in terms of resources and products – managers can apply their 
“dominant logics” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) in the new combined business and benefit 
from a diminishing need to learn about the business functions and processes in the target 
company business (Hitt, Harrison & Ireland, 2001). 
Companies also pursue acquisitions to pursue their strategic and long-term goals. 
Gaining market power and reducing their dependence on other organizations are among 
proactive strategic motivations for acquisitions. Brouthers et al. (1998) interviewed Dutch 
managers engaged in acquisition activities and found that market power was the most 
important motive for pursuing acquisitions. Acquiring a rival company results in fewer 
companies in an industry and not only elevates entry barriers for new entrants, but also 
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increases pricing power of the firm (Oler et al., 2008). Kim and Singal (1993) studied 
airline mergers in 1980s and showed that ticket price in routes served by merging firms 
increased compared to other routes. Companies also pursue acquisitions to limit their 
dependence on other organizations (Pfeffer, 1972). Particularly, acquisitions of raw 
material suppliers, product and process technology providers, and knowledge-based 
companies through vertical integration are common forms of reducing dependence on 
external organizations. In addition to proactive strategic motivations for acquisition, there 
are external factors that influence corporate strategies. From an institutional perspective, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that firms tend to behave similarly under isomorphic 
pressures. Mimetic pressure arguments explain that under conditions of uncertainty, firms 
tend to imitate behavior of successful and leading organizations in their field. Stearns and 
Allan (1996) studying merger waves explained the role of imitation in merger waves. 
They argued that fringe players “initiate the innovations that enable them to execute 
mergers. Merger waves occur when these actors become increasingly successful and their 
innovations are imitated through-out the business community” (Stearns & Allan, 1996: 
699). Similarly, network ties and board interlock influence managers’ decisions on 
pursuing acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993). 
Acquisition decisions are made by top managers. In addition to short-term and 
long-term goals, human factors are involved in acquisition decisions. Acquisition 
decisions are complex and multidimensional decisions that are not made solely on a 
techno-economic basis (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Managers make decisions based 
on their premises, biases, and limitations (March & Simon, 1958). Therefore, managers’ 
backgrounds, self-images, and assumptions influence acquisition decisions (Hambrick & 
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Mason, 1984). Recent studies in the management and finance area show that manager’s 
self-interests (i.e., compensation, power, and prestige) are strong motivations in pursuing 
acquisitions (see Haleblian et al., 2009). These studies reported that CEO’s post-
acquisition compensation generally increased, irrespective of acquisition performance 
(e.g., Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Harford & Li, 2007). In addition, managing larger firms 
provides managers with more discretion and power (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) as 
well as prestige (Brouthers et al., 1998). Besides self-interests, CEO’s hubris – 
exaggerated self-confidence – motivates and impacts acquisition decisions (Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). 
With all the motivations for pursuing acquisitions and the growing number of 
acquisition activities, the literature suggests that most acquisitions fail (Barkema & 
Schijven, 2008). King and his colleagues (2004) employed a meta-analysis technique to 
review empirical articles about mergers and acquisitions in accounting, finance, 
economics, and management journals and found robust results indicating that acquisitions 
had not led to positive changes in acquiring firms’ performance. Scholars studying the 
effect of acquisitions on firm value report similar results. These studies demonstrated that 
acquisitions did not enhance acquiring firms’ value in the short-term (Asquith, 1983; 
Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989) and the long-term (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Loderer 
& Martin, 1992). Because acquiring firms pay acquisition premiums for target companies, 
research showed that acquisitions generally have positive impacts on the acquired 
company’s value (Datta, Piches & Narayanan, 1992; Malatesta, 1983). 
Due to the impact of various factors on acquisition performance, scholars face 
challenges in operationalizing this concept. Therefore, there is a wide range of acquisition 
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performance measures in the literature. Zollo and Meier (2007) reviewed empirical M&A 
articles published in top finance and management journals between 1970 and 2006 and 
reported 12 different measures for acquisition performance including subjective and 
objective measures, measures with short and long time horizons, and operationalizations 
at different organizational levels. The most notable measures are market-based measures 
(short- and long-term abnormal stock returns), accounting-based measures (e.g., return on 
assets), survival analysis, and managers’ perceptions and analysis. Zollo and Meier (2007) 
indicated that the largest group of research studies in their sample (41%) used the short-
term window event study method. This method measures the stock market reaction to the 
acquisition around the acquisition announcement date. Stock market reactions to M&A 
announcements (short window studies) gauge “…the collective cognitive heuristic, the 
overall market “sentiment”, about how a given typology of acquisition … should 
perform.” (Zollo and Meier, 2007: 24). In other words, cumulative abnormal changes to 
the acquiring (or acquired) firm’s stock price around the acquisition announcement date 
are calculated and interpreted as a capital market’s unbiased expectation of future 
benefits of an acquisition based on all available information (Brown & Warner, 1985). 
The desirable property of shorter windows is that the market reaction is less likely to be 
contaminated by other extraneous events (Oler et al., 2008). Adoption of a short window 
event study method is based on the semi-strong version of the efficient-market hypothesis 
(EMH; Fama, 1970; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997), which asserts financial markets are 
informationally efficient and stock prices not only reflect all publically available 
information, but also instantly change based on new public information. However, in 
recent studies, scholars criticized the interpretations of short-term event studies 
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(Bromiley, Govekar & Markus, 1989; Oler et al., 2008; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). Mainly, 
the literature suggests that instead of interpreting short-term event study results of 
acquisition announcements as ‘value’ or ‘wealth’ created by the event, it should rather be 
interpreted as stock market assessment of expected value the event would create (Capron 
& Pistre, 2002; Kumar, 2005; Shen & Canella, 2003). Therefore, following Haleblian et 
al.’s (2009: 493) suggestion, we labeled the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in a 
short-window event study as “short-term market response to acquisition announcements”. 
Based on all publicly available information, a stock market reacts to an 
acquisition announcement by demonstrating its perception and evaluation of the expected 
future benefits of the acquisition. An acquisition is a complex and multi-dimensional 
event that influences multiple areas of the firm and can have deep and fundamental 
changes in firm operations. Consequently, prediction of its future outcome is difficult and 
requires taking multiple factors into consideration (Oler et al., 2008). Future success of an 
acquisition depends on the realization of synergy between acquiring and target 
organizations (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Hitt et al., 2001; Larsson & Finkelstein, 
1999). According to Barkema and Schijven (2008), the realization of synergy depends on 
two main groups of activities: careful target selection (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & 
Ireland, 1991; Ramaswamy, 1997) and effective post-acquisition integration (Chatterjee, 
Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992; Datta, 1991). In the target selection category, 
issues such as strategic and organizational fit between acquiring and target firm, 
information about potential target firms, and due diligence (Buono & Bowditch, 1989; 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991) can send signals to the market about the likelihood of 
synergy realization in a combined firm. On the other hand, future success of an 
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acquisition depends on the firm’s capabilities in future procedural (e.g., administrative, 
operations, management), physical (e.g., product lines, technologies, and other resources), 
and social integration (e.g., employees) (Shrivastava, 1986). In addition to target 
selection assessment and firm integration capability speculation, characteristics of an 
acquisition deal (e.g., premium, payment method) influence stock market reaction 
(Haleblian et al., 2009). Particularly, acquiring managers use acquisition premium, which 
is the additional value an acquiring firm intends to pay for each share of a target firm, to 
signal that the target firm’s stock price inadequately reflects the firm’s value and they can 
make more value (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). However, a large premium can 
negatively impact the acquiring firm’s shareholder return (Sirower, 1997) and ultimately 
acquisition performance. Similarly, payment methods (i.e., cash, stock, and combined) 
send distinct signals to the market. Managers tend to finance acquisitions by cash if they 
believe their stock is undervalued and by stock if its overvalued (King et al., 2004). 
Therefore, a cash-financed acquisition signals that managers have strong expectations 
about combined firm performance (King et al., 2004). In sum, perceptions of the market 
about three major groups of issues influence short-term market reaction to acquisition 
announcements: selected target characteristics, likelihood of successful integration, and 
acquisition deal characteristics. 
Corporate Reputation and Consequences 
Corporate reputation is a multidisciplinary concept. Scholars in economics, 
management, strategy, sociology, psychology, and marketing have studied corporate 
reputation. Application of corporate reputation in different disciplines is one of the 
sources of multiple definitions for corporate reputation. In their review of the 
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organizational reputation literature, Lange, Lee and Dai (2011) concluded that corporate 
reputation is a multidimensional concept and the pluralism in its definition is the 
reflection of its theoretical pluralism. They defined corporate reputation along three 
dimensions: “Being Known” (extent of awareness and knowledge about an organization), 
“Being Known for Something” (level of confidence in prediction of future behavior of an 
organization), and “Generalized Favorability” (extent of favorable or unfavorable 
judgment about an organization as a whole). They argued that despite overlaps among 
these dimensions, they are distinct based on two characteristics: judgment vs. impression 
and particular attribute vs. generalized picture. While “Being Known” is a generalized 
impression about an organization, “Being Know for Something” and “Generalized 
Favorability” are, respectfully, judgments about a particular attribute of an organization 
and an organization as a whole. While Lange et al. (2011) defined three dimensions of 
corporate reputation, Love and Kraatz (2009) took a more divergent approach and 
elaborated three distinct perspectives of reputation, i.e., organizational character, 
symbolic conformity, and technical efficacy. They emphasized that each of these 
perspectives are distinct in the evaluative logic that corporate audiences use to assess 
corporate reputation. The “Organizational Character” approach suggests that audiences of 
an organization perceive it as an exchange partner that they might have transactions with. 
Therefore, they want to learn about the “true” attributes of the organization. For this 
purpose, they tend to evaluate the organization based on its actions and the decisions it 
makes. They expect an organization with favorable reputation to possess desirable 
character traits such as trustworthiness, credibility, and reliability (Davies, Chun, da Silva 
& Roper, 2001; Fombrun, 1996). Unlike the “Organizational Character” perspective 
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where reputation assessment criteria are universal (e.g., trustworthiness), in the 
“Symbolic Conformity” approach, organizational audiences evaluate an organization 
based on its conformity with context-specific and socially constructed standards and 
norms (Rao, 1994; Staw & Epstein, 2000). Love and Kraatz (2009) indicated that this 
approach considers organizations and evaluators embedded within larger cultural systems 
(Rao, 1994). Therefore, they develop a mutual understanding about desirable and 
undesirable practices. Consequently, cultural fitness, conformity with social expectations, 
and adoption of socially desirable practices are the main criteria for audiences to assign 
approval and esteem to an organization. Consistent with this approach, Staw and Epstein 
(2000) showed that adoption of popular management practices (e.g., total quality 
management) that have positive value in society resulted in enhanced reputation, even 
though they did not improve financial performance. Different from the two previous 
approaches, an organization’s audiences in the “Technical Efficacy” perspective have a 
more utilitarian approach in evaluating the organization’s reputation. In other words, 
evaluators assess organization reputation based on its tangible outputs such as superior 
quality of products and services, and superior financial performance (Shapiro, 1983). As 
stakeholders of an organization have different interests in the organization, they might 
have different reputational assessments about the organization. For instance, while stock 
price is the primary interest of shareholders, financial stability is the central objective to 
creditors, and product quality and safety the main concern of customers. Therefore, 
depending on firm performance in these areas, it may have different reputational 
assessments. Love and Kraatz (2009) reported that downsizing negatively impacts 
corporate reputation. However, stock market reactions to downsizing varied depending 
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on firm performance, where downsizers with superior financial performance received less 
reputation damage. To address multiple stakeholders’ perceptions, Rindova and her 
colleagues (2005) studied components of reputation and how these components shape 
stakeholders’ perceptions as well as their behavior toward the organization. They argued 
that corporate reputation has two components: perceived quality and prominence. 
Perceived quality represents an economic perspective of reputation, which argues that a 
firm’s past actions work as signals reflecting the “true” attributes of the firm and 
influence stakeholders’ perceptions about a particular attribute of the firm (Clark & 
Montgomery, 1998; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). Depending on the interest and 
information that stakeholders attend to, they might have different perceptions about 
different attributes of the organization. On the other hand, the prominence component of 
reputation corresponds to an institutional perspective of reputation that is concerned with 
collective awareness and recognition of an organization among its stakeholders. An 
organization gains this recognition through interaction and information exchange with 
other entities in its organizational field (Fombrun, 1996; Rao, 1994; Rindova & Fombrun, 
1999). Furthermore, these two components of reputation determine consequences of an 
organization’s reputation by influencing stakeholders’ behavior. For example, customers 
are willing to pay price premiums to a firm that is perceived to produce superior quality 
products (Shapiro, 1983). Similarly, employees would like to work for prominent 
companies that are recognized and respected in society (Newburry, 2010). 
Scholars from different disciplines have done a considerable amount of research 
on the consequences of reputation. These studies can be grouped into three main 
categories. One stream of research investigated the effect of corporate reputation on 
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supportive behavior of stakeholders (i.e., customers, job applicants, and investors) in 
competitive markets (i.e., product, labor, and capital market) (Doh, Howton, Howton & 
Siegel, 2009; Newburry, 2010; Walsh, Mitchell, Jackson & Beatty, 2009). Walsh et al. 
(2009) showed that good reputation not only helps firms in retaining their customers 
(customer loyalty), but also it attracts new customers through word of mouth. In addition, 
customers are more willing to pay price premiums to reputed companies (Shapiro, 1983). 
Benjamin and Podolny (1999) demonstrated that wineries with high-status affiliations 
could charge price premiums for their reputation. Similar to product markets, research 
has reported positive impacts of good reputations in labor markets. Turban and Cable 
(2003), studying the effect of organization reputation on employment, showed that 
companies with better reputations both attract more job applicants and are able to select 
higher-quality ones. Likewise, based on a person-organization fit argument (Chatman, 
1989), Newburry (2010) showed that individuals are more willing to work for companies 
with better reputations. Reputation also impacts investors’ investment choices (Helm, 
2007; Shefrin, 2001). MacGregor and colleagues (2000) reported that an IPO’s reputation 
is a basis for investors’ buying decisions. In addition to initial investment decisions, 
Helm (2007) showed that firm reputation significantly impacts investor satisfaction and 
loyalty.  
The second strand of consequences of reputation studies examined the impact of 
corporate reputation on everyday operations and overall business of firms. These studies 
analyzed the impact of reputation on financial performance (Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun 
& Shanley, 1990), sustained financial performance (Roberts & Dowling, 2002), 
employee satisfaction and retention (Fombrun, 1996), and internal operations and 
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supplier relationship management (Alloza, 2008), among others. The third area of 
reputation consequences research concentrates on the investigation of the impacts of 
reputation on the firm’s strategic actions and organizational outcomes. Despite a large 
body of studies on reputation consequences, this area has been less studied and remains 
poorly understood (Pfarrer et al., 2010). Deephouse and Carter (2005), studying 
organizational practices, investigated the relationship between reputation and 
isomorphism. They showed that organizations with higher reputation can deviate from 
conforming behaviors. While deviation from conforming behaviors sounds questionable 
and could negatively impact companies with middle status, high-status companies are 
more secure in exhibiting non-conforming behavior (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). 
Stakeholders may even judge non-conforming behaviors positively by giving them 
“idiosyncratic credits”  (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Hollander, 1958; Phillips & Zuckerman, 
2001). In another study in this group, Saxton and Dollinger (2004) examined acquisitions 
and found that favorable reputation of a target company significantly impacts the 
acquirer’s satisfaction. In this paper, we intend to expand this area of research by 
examining how the reputation of a company influences stock market reactions to its 
strategic decisions regarding acquiring another company. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this study, we intend to investigate the impact of intangible assets on market 
reaction to acquisition announcements..For this purpose, we selected an intangible asset 
specifically related to the strategic action, namely, acquirer’s acquisition experience, and 
two other general intangible assets, i.e., acquirer’s reputation and social responsibility 
approach. In addition to direct effects, we examine the combined impact of acquisition 
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experience and reputation on market response to acquisition announcement. 
Acquisition Experience 
An acquisition announcement brings about a stock market reaction to an acquiring 
company’s stock price. Market reaction demonstrates market expectations about the 
future success of an acquisition based on all available information (Fama, 1970; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). One of the factors that impacts stock market expectations 
about success of an acquisition is the acquiring company’s acquisition experience. A 
large body of literature studied the impact of learning and acquisition experience on 
acquisition success but reported mixed results (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). While some 
studies found a positive relationship between acquisition experience and acquisition 
performance (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989), others found no significant relationship 
(Hayward, 2002; Zollo & Singh, 2004) or a U-shaped relationship (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo & Reuer, 2006). Although there is no consensus on the impact of 
acquisition experience on acquisition performance in the literature, acquisition experience 
is an extra piece of information that the stock market can use to lower information 
uncertainty (Spence, 1973) and influence stock market expectation about the success of 
the acquisition.  
As mentioned earlier, three groups of information shape stock market expectation 
about acquisition success: deal characteristics, target company selection, and successful 
integration (factors influencing synergy realization). Determination of acquisition deal 
characteristics such as acquisition premium, payment method, and acquisition type is 
highly dependent on the top management team and governance structure of an acquiring 
company. Acquiring companies with more acquisition experience develop learning skills 
97 
in the valuation of target companies as well as incorporate mechanisms and structures for 
effective decision making. For instance, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) showed that a 
vigilant board of directors could restrain a CEO from decisions influenced by hubris. In 
addition, experienced acquirers incur lower transaction costs by accumulating more 
knowledge about payment method choice as well as developing more stable and efficient 
relationships with banks and other intermediary financial institutions that send positive 
signals to the stock market.  
Similarly, acquisition experience is valuable in the process of analyzing potential 
target companies. Particularly, prior literature indicated that information gathering about 
potential targets, due diligence, and evaluation of strategic and organizational fit are 
essential steps in acquisition success (Datta, 1991; Galpin & Herndon, 2007; Hitt et al., 
2001). Through past experience, acquirers learn about the type of information they need 
and more efficient ways to acquire this information. Furthermore, they create expertise in 
due diligence processes and assessment of strategic and organizational fit.  
The third area that affects stock market evaluation of the future outcome of an 
acquisition is the acquirer’s capacity in integrating target companies. Previous acquisition 
experience helps acquiring companies to develop routines for future acquisitions 
(Szulanski, 1996). Organizational routines are repetitive organizational activities that 
guide organizational decisions (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Firms gain expertise and 
competence in a routine by accumulating experience in it (Haleblian, Kim & Rajagopalan, 
2006). Routines are important in acquisitions and specifically in integration processes 
where there is a high level of uncertainty. As an acquirer pursues more acquisitions, these 
routines become more developed, accessible, transparent, and immediate (Hayward, 
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2002). These routines can become a source of competitive advantage and play a critical 
role in organizational decision making (March, 1999). Routines are more effective in 
similar organizational activities. Particularly, they are effective sources for successful 
procedural integration (i.e., combination of administrative systems and rules), which has 
similar building blocks across acquisitions (Shrivastava, 1986). In addition, routines are 
imperative for speed of integration, which positively impacts acquisition success 
(Homburg & Bucerius, 2006). Similary, Ashkenas, DeMonaco and Francis (1998) and 
Hitt, Harrison, Ireland and Best (1998) showed that organizations with prior acquisition 
experience are better at improving effectiveness and efficiency of integration processes. 
However, there are fundamental requirements for past experience to lead to 
organizational learning and ultimately success. It’s important to note that experience 
effects are not always positive. Specially, transfer of past experience to the settings where 
past lessons do not apply is not positive (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999) showed that generalization of past experience in dissimilar situations 
does not lead to positive outcomes. In particular, acquisitions are complex projects that 
involve different areas of organization and consist of many interdependent subactivities 
(Hitt et al., 2001). Furthermore, acquisitions are different from each other and the 
acquisition process should be customized to each deal (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; 
Galpin & Herndon, 2007). Therefore, acquiring companies face high levels of causal 
ambiguity due to the complexity and heterogeneity of acquisitions (Lippman & Rumelt, 
1992; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) demonstrated that there are 
differences in application of past acquisition experience between novice (i.e., acquirers 
with limited acquisition experience) and expert (i.e., acquirers with extensive acquisition 
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experience) acquirers. While novices realize more obvious and surface information, 
experts capture both surface and underlying features (Novick, 1988). Furthermore, novice, 
compared to expert, acquirers make more inappropriate generalizations of past 
acquisition experiences (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). In other words, the information 
and knowledge a novice acquirer gains in its first acquisition experience is very 
superficial. It uses this information as the base for the second acquisition (e.g., 
inappropriate generalization) without realizing the underlying differences between the 
acquisitions, resulting in lower performance (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). By 
pursuing more acquisitions, the novice acquirer gains acquisition expertise and 
knowledge about underlying dissimilarities between acquisitions and consequently makes 
less inappropriate generalizations and more appropriate generalizations (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). Building on this past research, we expect stock markets to react 
negatively to acquisition announcements of novice acquirers and positively to those of 
expert acquirers. Therefore, we suggest following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a U-shape relationship between acquiring company 
acquisition experience and stock market reaction to its acquisition announcement. 
Corporate Reputation 
A corporate acquisition is a complex event involving multiple interconnected 
areas of an organization in various ways (Oler et al., 2008). Although acquisitions include 
some routines and similar activities, they are distinct from each other, and furthermore, 
most of them fail (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). The common characteristic of all 
acquisitions is the high level of uncertainty in every step of the pre- and post-acquisition 
processes. Acquiring company’s managers face uncertainty due to information 
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asymmetry between them and potential target organizations. Uncertainty about reactions 
of managers and shareholders of a target company influences an acquiring company’s 
choice of acquisition type, premium, and payment method. Uncertainty also negatively 
impacts employees of both acquiring and target companies, making them anxious about 
integration processes, new procedures, lay-offs, and most importantly, working with 
employees in the other organization with different organizational cultures, norms, and 
value systems. The impact of uncertainty goes beyond internal stakeholders and affects 
outside stakeholders, as well. Suppliers worry about new policies and requirements, new 
transactions, and new competitions. Similarly, distribution channels face uncertainty 
about how acquisitions may change their established relationships with acquiring and 
acquired companies. Customers are also uncertain about short-term and long-term 
consequences of an acquisition and how the acquisition may affect their relationship with 
combining organizations as well as the quality and price of products and services. For 
instance, the merger of Continental Airlines and United Air Lines took more than a year 
to consolidate their different ticket reservation systems, online portals, and frequent flyer 
program activities such as earning and redeeming mileage, upgrades, and elite status, 
among others, all of which creates questions and confusion in customers not only about 
the short-term consequences of the merger, but also how it will affect the quality and 
price of the joint United Airlines in the future. 
All these uncertainties impact the stock market expectation about the future of an 
acquisition. Therefore, corporate reputation that can lower information uncertainty would 
be very valuable to stakeholders and particularly the stock market (Benjamin & Podolny, 
1999; Spence, 1973; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). Rindova et al. (2005) compared how 
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reputation lowers information uncertainty by signaling the “true” attributes of an 
organization from economic and institutional perspectives. From an economic 
perspective, reputation is formed based on past actions, choices, and decisions made by 
an organization. In other words, past behavior of an organization informing its reputation 
reveals its “true” attributes, which are very specific rather than general, such as product 
quality, innovativeness, and social responsiveness (Lange et al., 2011). From an 
institutional perspective, “true” attributes of an organization are unveiled through 
interaction and information exchange among diverse actors in the organizational field 
(Rindova et al., 2005). Particularly, institutional intermediaries and high-status actors 
have important roles in publicizing the “true” attributes of an organization by their 
superior ability to access and disseminate information (Rindova et al., 2005). 
All in all, two main components of reputation, namely perceived quality and 
prominence (Rindova et al., 2005), provide stakeholders with valuable information about 
acquiring and target companies. Favorable reputation of an acquiring company positively 
influences deal characteristics and target selection process. Potential target managers and 
shareholder would prefer to be acquired by a company known for its good reputation. In 
addition, good reputation can facilitate integration processes and minimizes conflicts. 
Specifically, reputation plays a critical role in managerial and sociocultural integration. 
Good reputation gives an acquiring company legitimacy to mobilize organizations toward 
integration, combining cultures, managerial systems, and organizational structures (Vaara 
& Monin, 2010). Favorable reputation provides the target company’s employees with 
information that lowers uncertainty and increases their confidence to accept the change. 
Furthermore, good reputation reduces transaction costs within two organizations 
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as well as between combined companies and other resource and service providers outside 
the organization (Bergh, Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh, 2010). Reputation reflecting the 
trustworthiness and credibility of an acquiring company can become a discriminating 
factor for target company employees and outside stakeholders (Williamson, 1996). 
Trustworthiness reduces transaction costs by lowering the likelihood of an acquiring 
firm’s opportunistic behavior. Companies with good reputation willingly relinquish short-
term benefits of opportunistic behavior for long-term benefits of favorable reputation 
(Chiles & McMackin, 1996). Therefore, good reputation facilitates a target company’s 
employees renewing and redefining their relationship and interactions, including 
contracts with the acquiring company, incurring less transaction costs. 
Also, good acquiring company reputation impacts its relationship with potential 
outside partners. Suppliers and service providers incur transaction costs due to bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and risks in search for partners, negotiation processes, and 
enforcing contracts, and a strong reputation of the acquiring company reduces these costs 
(Bergh et al., 2010; Chiles & McMackin, 1996). In sum, favorable reputation of an 
acquiring company has a positive impact on deal characteristics, target selection, and 
integration processes, and consequently, on the expectations of the stock market about 
future benefits of the acquisition. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between acquiring company 
reputation and market reaction to its acquisition announcement. 
Impact of Acquirer’s Reputation on its Acquisition Experience 
Corporate reputation adds a new dimension to an already complex acquisition 
process for acquirers. On the one hand, it impacts stock market opinions by revealing 
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more information about the attributes of acquirer, and on the other hand, it influences the 
acquirer’s top management by increasing the complexity of decision making. Reputed 
companies are more covered by media and more information about their activities is 
disseminated (Wartick, 1992). Strategic actions of these more visible companies attract 
more attention, especially when it comes to debating strategies such as acquisitions, of 
which the majority have been shown to fail (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Under these 
circumstances, other characteristics of the acquirer and particularly its acquisition 
experience become more important. 
A highly positive reputation may not only be not positive for a novice acquirer, 
but may also be detrimental for three main reasons. First, one of the factors that results in 
negative acquisition performance is top management team hubris, defined as exaggerated 
self-confidence (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Hayward and Hambrick (1997) identified 
three sources of CEO hubris: recent organizational success, media praise, and self-
importance. An acquirer’s high reputation reflects its superior quality and prominence 
(Rindova et al, 2005). Media praise the top management team and organizational actors 
attribute their organization’s success to them. Therefore, the top management team gains 
more confidence and develops greater expectations about their abilities (Brockner, 1988; 
Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Jacobs, Berscheid, & Walster, 1971). These greater 
expectations about their ability combined with their lack of acquisition experience lead 
novice acquirers with high reputations to overlook the dissimilarities between 
acquisitions and neglect to take necessary actions, consequently leading them to 
potentially acquire target companies that are beyond their capabilities to integrate. 
Second, companies with high reputation, which attract more attention and are 
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more covered by media, are more cautious and constrained in their actions in order to 
protect their good reputation (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). Post-acquisition processes 
include activities such as cutting costs and duplicated activities that are not necessarily 
favored by stakeholders. Unlike expert acquirers, novice acquirers with high reputations 
do not have sufficient acquisition experience to realize solutions that can facilitate post-
acquisition processes without harming the acquirer’s high reputation. In other words, 
high reputation intensifies the negative impact of lack of acquisition experience for 
novice acquirers. Finally, attracting more attention, reputed companies not only are under 
isomorphic pressure to pursue strategies that are adopted by their peers (Deephouse, 
1996), but they also are under higher expectations to perform better than their peers with 
lower reputations (Rindova et al., 2005). These institutional pressures negatively 
influence acquirers with less acquisition experience in the selection of target companies 
and implementing acquisition activities, especially when there is no strong and 
economically justifiable motivation. 
In sum, reputation magnifies the importance of acquisition experience. For novice 
acquirers, in particular, it intensifies the negative effect of lack of sufficient acquisition 
experience on the expected outcome of acquisition. However, for expert acquirers that 
could realize both surface and underlying similarities as well as dissimilarities between 
acquisitions, high reputation amplifies the positive value of acquisition expertise. 
Extended acquisition experience creates organizational knowledge that lowers top 
management hubris, prevents inappropriate generalization, and supports appropriate 
discrimination. Having extended acquisition experience, expert acquirers are not only 
free from institutional isomorphic pressure, but they also have expertise in adopting 
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effective post-acquisition activities without harming their reputation, thus allowing them 
to augment reputation with acquisition expertise. Therefore, we predict that acquirer 
reputation intensifies acquisition experience, negatively for novice acquirers and 
positively for expert ones. According, we suggest following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The reputation of the acquiring company magnifies the relationship 
between acquisition experience and market reaction to acquisition announcement. 
Acquirer’s Social Responsibility Approach 
Market reaction to an organization’s action varies according to the nature and 
complexity of that action. In particular, an acquisition is characterized as a non-routine 
practice that impacts multiple areas of an acquiring company. Although acquisitions 
comprise similar steps such as due diligence and integration, they are different in content 
depending on acquisition type (e.g., diversification or cross-border acquisition), target 
company type (e.g., start-up, joint venture, subsidiary, private, or public company), 
acquisition attitude (e.g., friendly or hostile), and acquisition form (e.g., disclosed or 
undisclosed) among other factors. These complexities increase the uncertainty about the 
future outcome of the acquisition. In addition, the stock market is bounded to consider all 
the factors in the pre- and post-acquisition periods that might influence the future success 
of an acquisition. Therefore, the stock market uses heuristic models formed based on the 
accumulated knowledge from past acquisition practices in order to estimate the future 
value of a focal acquisition announcement (Zollo & Meier, 2007). Furthermore, the fact 
that the majority of acquisitions fail (Barkema & Schijven, 2008) or do not result in a 
positive change in the acquirer’s performance (King et al, 2004) causes the stock market 
to take a conservative approach to estimating the future value of an announced 
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acquisition. In these circumstances, past actions revealing the “true” attributes of an 
acquiring firm, partially reduce information uncertainty and impact stock market 
expectations about the ability of a firm to create value from an acquisition. Past actions 
are a reflection of the firm’s philosophy about the role of firm in society and choice of its 
primary stakeholder. This philosophy is one of the factors that could augur an 
acquisition’s outcome. In other words, this philosophy is the grounds for critical 
decisions that an acquiring firm needs to make after the acquisition to develop strategies 
for integrating the companies and creating synergy. Companies believing in their 
responsibility toward society would pursue different strategies from companies that 
recognize interests of society after their own financial interests. Socially responsible 
companies consider their legal, ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities in addition to 
economic responsibility in their decisions (Carroll, 1979). In practice, “corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and 
contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce 
and their families as well as of the local community and society at large” (The World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development, 1998: 3). Therefore, these companies 
feel responsible regarding the impact of their activities, strategies, and decisions on 
employees, community, and the environment. A CSR mindset prevents a company from 
pursuing strategies that could create economic value for the company at the expense of 
society. Particularly, a CSR mindset impacts acquisition outcomes. Acquisitions are 
evaluated based on the capability of the acquirer to create short-term economic benefits 
through increasing revenues and cutting costs. The stock market expects acquirers with 
more favorable CSR reputations and records of higher transparency, human rights, and 
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environmental standards to take more lenient approaches in post-acquisition integration 
processes to meet societal expectations. This in turn would prevent legitimate but less 
socially-favored strategies such as significant workforce reduction. On the other hand, 
market-savvy acquirers are more willing to utilize all legitimate capacities for cost 
reduction and revenue generation. Having a shareholder primacy mindset, these 
companies pursue strategies that put shareholders’ interests above other stakeholders. In 
other words, the impact of a potential firm strategy on shareholders’ wealth is the main 
criterion to adopt a strategy. Past behavior of these companies such as investment choice, 
lay-offs, and product and market positioning signals their approach to the stock market. 
Therefore, the stock market is more confident that market-savvy acquirers are more 
aggressive in creating value out of the acquisition, while it perceives acquirers with 
higher CSR reputations as less efficient in cost reduction and revenue generation. 
Consequently, they will produce less cash flow after an acquisition compared to acquirers 
with lower CSR reputation. Accordingly, we suggest following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The stock market reacts more negatively to acquisition 
announcements of socially responsible companies. 
METHODS 
Sample 
The sample consists of 296 acquisitions (both disclosed and undisclosed) 
conducted by the 87 largest (by revenue) US companies from 23 industries including 
both financial and non-financial sectors in 2010. The list of acquirers was identified 
based on the companies evaluated by the Reputation Institute as part of their 2009 
RepTrack Pulse study (Reputation Institute, 2009). The acquisition includes both public 
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and private target companies. Acquisition, acquirer, and target company data are 
collected using Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC Platinum) Merger & Acquisition 
database. All explanatory and control variables are lagged one year. 
Dependent Variable 
Market reaction to M&A announcement. We used a short-window event study, 
the most frequently used method in the acquisition literature (Zollo & Meier, 2007), to 
measure market expectation about the future of an announced acquisition. This method 
estimates the cumulative abnormal security returns (CAR) of an acquirer company in a 
short window around the acquisition announcement date. CARs are calculated in three 
steps: (1) estimating the expected (if announcement had not been made) acquirer’s 
security return for each day in the specified window, (2) calculating the abnormal return 
by subtracting the expected return from the actual market return on each day in the study 
window, and (3) aggregating abnormal returns in the study window. We used a short-
term window of 5 days prior to the announcement to 1 day after the announcement. The 
advantage of a short-term window is that it minimizes noises from other confounding 
variables (Haleblian et al., 2009). We included 5 days prior to the announcement in the 
study window to allow for information leaks prior to official announcements. We used 
SDC Platinum to collect data on the acquirer and acquisition date and used the EVENTUS 
software package, which acquires stock market data directly from the Center for 
Research in Securities Pricing (CRSP) US stock databases, to calculate CAR for each 
event. 
Independent Variables 
Acquisition experience (H1). Following Barkema and Schijven (2008) and Fowler 
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and Schmidt (1989), we measured an acquirer’s acquisition experience by counting the 
number of its acquisitions in the previous 4 years (2006 – 2009). We collected acquisition 
experience data through SDC Platinum. 
Corporate reputation (H2). Acquirer reputation is obtained from the Reputation 
Institute’s 2009 RepTrack Pulse study (Reputation Institute, 2009). The Reputation 
Institute administered a multi-item online survey to measure perceptions of individuals 
from the general public about the reputation of a company. Past qualitative studies 
showed the content validity of this measure in the US (Ponzi, Fombrun & Gardberg, 
2011). Unlike other reputation measures, which are based on opinions of a narrowly 
defined group such as business analysts, the Reputation Institute’s measure is notable 
since it is derived from broader public attitudes. However, individuals were required to 
demonstrate some knowledge about a company to participate in the survey. For this 
purpose, they needed to answer 3 out of 4 screening questions (Asher, 2004). Moreover, 
respondents were selected to represent the general population by gender and age. The 
RepTrack Pulse reputation index comprised four items: (1) “good overall reputation”, (2) 
“a company I have a good feeling about”, (3) “a company that I trust”, and (4) “a 
company that I admire and respect” (Reputation Institute, 2009). All four items were on a 
7-point Likert scale, where “1” indicates “strongly disagree” and “7” indicates “strongly 
agree”. Respondents also had the option to indicate “not sure”. The Chronbach Alpha for 
this scale is 0.988. Unidimensionality, convergent validity, and fit of the scale items were 
confirmed by LISREL. An acquirer’s reputation is calculated by creating an average of 
the scores of all respondents who evaluated the acquirer and then converted to a 0 – 100 
scale for ease of interpretation. 
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Social responsibility (H3). We used KLD Research & Analytics (KLD) data to 
measure an acquirer’s approach toward society. KLD creates profile of company 
performance based on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) factors. KLD 
measures the number of strengths of and concerns about a firm’s performance in the 
following categories: community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights, and products. To construct our measure, we calculated the 
total strengths of a company and subtracted its total concerns. Acquirers with higher 
scores demonstrated more involvement in societal responsibilities. 
Control Variables 
Numerous factors impact market reaction to an acquisition announcement. In 
order to rule out the impact of other factors, we control for five variables that have been 
shown in past studies to influence expectations about the future outcome of an acquisition. 
Acquirer size is one of these factors (Haleblian et al., 2009), which was measured as the 
natural logarithm of an acquirer’s book value in twelve month prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Larger acquirers possess more assets and resources that facilitate 
integration with target companies and increase post-acquisition asset productivity (Healy, 
Palepu & Ruback, 1992). Another factor that affects expectations about the future of an 
acquisition is Acquirer profitability (Capron & Shen, 2007), which was measured as the 
ratio of an acquirer’s net income to its total assets in the year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Acquirers with poor performance might be motivated to pursue 
acquisitions to hide their poor performance (Capron & Shen, 2007). On the other hand, 
acquirers with superior performance are more likely to be able to succeed in post-
acquisition processes. Acquirer industry also can influence expectations about future 
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acquisition performance (Bergh, 1997). Industry characteristics such regulations, 
technology, and capital structure of businesses in an industry could influence 
attractiveness and expected success of acquisitions as a strategic choice (Haleblian et al., 
2006). Particularly, businesses in financial industries have more resources (including 
capital resources) to undertake acquisitions. Therefore, we controlled for acquirers in 
financial sectors. Another factor that influences stock market reaction to an acquisition 
announcement is availability of information about a target company. While there is less 
information available about private companies, the market has good information access 
regarding public targets. Availability of information lowers information asymmetries and 
increases confidence in the market about the outcome of an acquisition. Accordingly, we 
controlled for Target type using a dummy variable, valued “1” for public and “0” for 
private targets. Finally, we controlled for acquirer and target relatedness, which was 
measured as a dummy variable with a value of “1” for acquirer and target companies with 
similar 3-digit SIC codes. By acquiring from the same or a similar industry, an acquirer 
can appropriately generalize their knowledge (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). In addition, 
post-acquisition processes and the success of integration of companies depend on the 
level of relatedness of acquiring and target companies (Bragado, 1992; Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991; Homburg & Bucerius, 2006). 
RESULTS 
We tested our hypotheses using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations between variables. There are 
seven correlations at a moderate level, but no correlation is reported above 0.50, well 
below the common used cut-off of 0.70 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Collinearity 
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diagnosis indicates that the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) is 1.72 and the highest 
individual score is 2.18, which is far below the commonly used threshold of 10 (see Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). Therefore, no multicollinearity problem is diagnosed. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 
1 Std. CAR [-5,+1] -0.14 0.99 -5.72 2.80  
2 Acquirer size 2.88 1.00 -0.11 4.91 -0.04 
3 Acquirer profitability 0.08 0.06 -0.07 0.28 -0.01 0.11*
4 Acquirer industry 0.11 0.32 0 1 -0.07 0.28*
5 Target type: Public 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.10 -0.06
6 Relatedness 0.56 0.50 0 1 -0.07 0.11
7 Acq. experience 23.66 19.17 0 71 -0.08 0.27*
8 Acquirer reputation 70.31 8.53 30.28 84.07 -0.14* 0.03
9 CSR reputation 2.02 5.32 -10 14 -0.14* -0.10
 
 Variable 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4 Acquirer industry -0.43*  
5 Target type: Public -0.07 -0.01  
6 Relatedness 0.26* -0.21* -0.01  
7 Acq. experience 0.30* 0.07 -0.07 0.36*  
8 Acquirer reputation 0.46* -0.42* -0.01 0.22* 0.16* 
9 CSR reputation 0.44* -0.11* -0.02 0.33* 0.37* 0.47*
* p<0.05 
Table 2 presents OLS regression results for market reaction (CAR) to acquisition 
announcements and includes six models. All models test the full sample of 296 events. 
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Table 2: Regression Results for Market Reaction to M&A Announcement 
Variable H Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Control  H1  H2  H3  H4  Full  
        
Constant  -0.037 (0.20) -0.202 (0.21) -0.175 (0.20) -0.452* (0.23) -0.039 (0.19) -0.405+ (0.23)
Acquirer size  0.001 (0.06) 0.022 (0.06) 0.017 (0.06) 0.098 (0.07) -0.042 (0.07) 0.071 (0.08)
Acquirer profitability  -0.317 (1.14) -0.838 (1.21) 0.813 (1.18) 0.016 (1.31) 1.120 (1.27) 0.386 (1.37)
Acquirer industry (Financial)  -0.291 (0.22) -0.469* (0.24) -0.493* (0.23) -0.638** (0.25) -0.169 (0.22) -0.560* (0.26)
Target type: Public  0.269+ (0.16) 0.276+ (0.15) 0.280+ (0.15) 0.240 (0.15) 0.274+ (0.15) 0.245 (0.15)
Acq. & target relatedness  -0.162 (0.12) -0.192 (0.13) -0.131 (0.12) -0.105 (0.13) -0.070 (0.13) -0.080 (0.13)
        
Acquisition experience H1  -0.009* (0.00)  -0.007 (0.00)  -0.006 (0.00)
Acquisition experience sq. H1  0.001** (0.00)  0.000* (0.00)  0.000* (0.00)
Acquirer reputation H2   -0.025** (0.01) -0.043*** (0.01)  -0.038** (0.01)
Reputation x Experience H3    -0.001+ (0.00)  -0.001 (0.00)
Reputation x Experience sq. H3    0.000* (0.00)  0.000* (0.00)
CSR reputation H4     -0.032* (0.01) -0.014 (0.02)
        
No. of acquisitions  296  296  296  296  296  296  
R-squared  0.023  0.050  0.057  0.088  0.042  0.091  
Adj. R-squared  0.006  0.026  0.037  0.056  0.023  0.056  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
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Model 1 only consists of control variables and is the baseline model. All other 
five show significantly stronger explanatory power than the baseline model. Model 2 
tests H1, which suggests a U-shaped relationship between acquirer acquisition experience 
and market response to its acquisition announcement. In order to test H1 in Model 2, 
acquirer acquisition experience and the square value of its acquisition experience are 
added to baseline model. The significant negative coefficient of acquisition experience 
(p<0.05) and the significant positive coefficient of square of acquisition experience 
(p<0.01) support H1. Further investigation demonstrates that the inflection point is 
experience of 38 acquisitions in previous 4 years. In other words, the market reacts 
negatively to acquisition experience until a firm reaches 38 acquisitions and then begins a 
positive trend. Figure 1 depicts this curvilinear relationship. 
Figure 1: Impact of acquirer’s acquisition experience on market reaction to 
acquisition announcement 
 
H2 hypothesizes a positive relationship between acquirer reputation and market 
reaction to its acquisition announcement. Model 3 incorporates acquirer reputation in the 
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baseline model to test H2. Although the result reports a significant coefficient (p<0.01), 
the direction is opposite to what we expected. Therefore, H2 is not supported.  
Model 4 tests the interaction effect of acquirer acquisition experience and 
reputation proposed in H3. H3 suggests that acquirer reputation magnifies the impact of 
acquisition experience on market reaction. To test H3, in addition to acquirer reputation, 
acquisition experience, and square value of acquisition experience, interaction terms 
between reputation and acquisition experience as well as reputation and square value of 
acquisition experience are included in the model. The marginally significant and negative 
(p<0.10) coefficient of interaction between reputation and acquisition experience 
accompanied with a positive and significant (p<0.05) coefficient of interaction between 
reputation and square value of acquisition experience confirm the magnifying effect of 
reputation on acquisition experience and support H3. Figure 2 illustrates the magnifying 
role of reputation by depicting the impact of acquisition experience on market reaction at 
three levels of acquirer reputation – plus one standard deviation, mean level, and minus 
one standard deviation (Aiken & West, 1991, pp. 68-69). Further probing shows that the 
inflection points for acquirers with high, medium, and low reputations are 33, 34, and 111 
prior acquisitions, respectively. This shows that higher reputation decreases the turning 
point, indicating that for more reputed acquirers, less acquisition experience is required to 
reach an inflection point. In other words, each acquisition experience counts more for 
more reputed acquirers. Moreover, Figure 2 demonstrates that from low to high 
reputation, the U-shaped curves become deeper (i.e., the absolute value of the slope for 
any specific acquisition experience value grows going from the low to the high reputation 
curve). Thus, the relationship between acquisition experience and market reaction 
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becomes more intense and sensitive, confirming H3. 
Figure 2: Impact of acquirer’s acquisition experience on market reaction to 
acquisition announcement at different level of acquirer’s reputation 
 
To test H4, CSR reputation of the acquirer is added to the baseline model in 
Model 5. The negative and significant (p<0.05) coefficient of CSR reputation confirms 
the negative relationship between CSR reputation and market expectation about the 
future of an acquisition and therefore, supports H4. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we intended to take our understanding about the impact of intangible 
assets on strategic actions and organizational outcomes to a new level. To accomplish this 
goal, we investigated the outcome of acquirer acquisition experience, reputation, and 
business ideology on stock market expectations about success of an acquisition attempt. 
We found that both action-specific factual and general perceptual intangible assets not 
only have significant direct impacts, but also have significant combined effects on stock 
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market expectations. In particular, our results showed that acquirer acquisition experience 
has a U-shaped relationship with market expectation about the success of an acquisition. 
In other words, the market does not expect that acquirers without sufficient experience 
can benefit from their acquisition experience. Opposite to our expectation, our analysis 
reported that acquirer reputation has a negative relationship with market expectations 
about the future outcome of an acquisition. Moreover, our investigation demonstrated 
that reputation magnifies the importance of acquisition experience. Finally, an acquirer’s 
beliefs about its role in society also impacts market reaction to its acquisition. More 
specifically, the market expects acquirers with better records of socially responsible 
behavior to be less successful in creating value out of acquisitions. 
In the first hypothesis, we investigated the effect of acquisition experience on 
market expectation about the outcome of an acquisition. There is a rich body of literature 
on the impact of acquisition experience on success of an acquisition. However, the 
findings are not consistent and there is no consensus about the effect of acquisition 
experience (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Some studies reported no relationship (Hayward, 
2002; Zollo & Singh, 2004), while others showed positive (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989) or 
U-shaped relationships (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo & Reuer, 2006). Our 
analysis demonstrated a U-shaped impact of acquisition experience. This finding 
confirms critics of traditional organizational learning assumptions that assume experience 
effects are always positive and equate experience with learning (Barkema & Schijven, 
2008). On the other hand, it is consistent with Haleblian and Finkelstein’s (1999) 
categorization of novice and expert acquirers. Unlike expert acquirers who have 
extensive acquisition experience, novice acquirers only realize surface information about 
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a target company without understanding the underlying factors (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999). Consequently, without realizing similarities and dissimilarities between past and 
future acquisitions, they conduct more inappropriate generalizations and less appropriate 
discrimination (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Our analysis showed that, in general, 
acquirers with more than 38 prior acquisitions in the past four years can gain the market’s 
confidence about their ability to benefit from their past acquisition experiences. 
Further, we tested the relationship between another intangible asset, corporate 
reputation, and expectation about the outcome of an acquisition. Contrary to our 
expectation, results showed that acquirer reputation has a negative relation with 
evaluations of future value creation of an acquisition. In other words, the market has 
lower expectations about the ability of acquisitions conducted by more reputed acquirers 
to improve their overall market performance. To probe more on this finding, we re-ran 
the analysis using Fortune’s Most Admire Companies score and found similar results. 
Also, results reported that on average, the market has lower perceptions about acquisition 
outcomes of acquirers listed in Fortune’s Most Admire Companies compared to those are 
not recognized in the list.  
These consistent findings can be explained from three perspectives. First, the 
effect of reputation should be analyzed depending on its context. In this case, an 
acquisition is not considered as a successful strategy. The majority of acquisitions fail 
(Barkema & Schijven, 2008), did not result in positive performance for acquirers (King et 
al., 2004), or could not enhance value of acquiring firms neither in the short-term 
(Asquith, 1983; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989) nor in the long-term (Agrawal et al., 1992; 
Loderer & Martin, 1992). In this circumstance, conformity with a practice that is 
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perceived as generally not successful by a reputed acquirer, which attracts more attention 
and is held to higher standards of what type of strategies and behaviors it pursues, tends 
to be subject to greater market evaluation penalties. Second, past studies showed that 
reputation has a positive impact on a firm’s financial performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990). A company’s reputation is already accounted for in its stock price (Fama, 1970). 
In other words, “$X” of stock price of a reputed firm is the realization of its favored 
reputation. In order for the market to show a positive response to an acquisition 
announcement, at least the “$X” effect of reputation in the acquirer’s stock price should 
not diminish more than the expected future gain of the acquisition. However, in 
acquisition announcements, the stock market is skeptical of whether an acquisition can 
contribute to the reputation of already reputed companies, particularly when there is not 
sufficient information about private targets or undisclosed deals. The third way to explain 
the negative relationship between reputation and market reaction to an acquisition is 
through acquirer motivation to conduct an acquisition. Particularly, companies with lower 
reputations try more aggressively to acquire reputed targets to improve their reputations 
in addition to other motivations, while already reputed acquirers have more economic 
motives for acquisitions.  
In sum, our results showed that while reputation does not have a direct positive 
impact on stock market evaluations, it can have a positive effect combined with 
acquisition experience. The analysis demonstrated that reputation magnifies the 
relationship between acquisition experience and expectation of acquisition outcome. 
More specifically, the U-shaped relationship between acquisition experience and 
acquisition outcome becomes deeper and more intense as the reputation level increases 
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from low to medium to high (see Figure 2). In addition, an acquisition attempt counts 
more for a more reputed company which is demonstrated by the number of acquisition 
attempts required to reach the inflection point in Figure 2. Finally, we found that an 
acquirer’s approach toward its societal responsibility determines market evaluation of its 
acquisition. The market expects acquirers with stronger beliefs in its responsibility 
toward society, higher standards for their social and environmental activities, and better 
records of social performance to be less willing to adopt legitimate but less socially-
favored strategies in creating value out of acquisitions. Therefore, acquirers with higher 
social performance are expected to be less successful in acquisitions. 
Our findings also suggest implications for managers of acquiring firms. We found 
that intangible assets have significant impacts on organizational strategies and outcomes. 
Managers can enjoy “economies of scale” benefits by utilizing their action-specific 
intangible assets and “economies of scope” benefits by applying their general intangible 
assets into different strategic actions. However, the impact of intangible assets might not 
be simple and consistent with general beliefs. In particular and for acquisition practices, 
the findings refuted simple positive relationships between acquisition experience, 
reputation, and social performance and expected acquisition outcome. On the other hand, 
results showed a U-shaped relationship between acquisition success and acquisition 
experience and negative relations with reputation and social performance. Furthermore, 
managers of less experienced acquirers should be aware of negative impacts of 
inappropriate generalization and discrimination. They should go beyond surface 
information and realize the underlying similarities and differences between acquisitions. 
Within our sample, the market does not expect managers to benefit from acquisition 
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experience prior to conducting 38 acquisitions in 4 years prior to the new acquisition. 
Practically speaking, since few companies are able to pursue acquisitions at that rate, for 
most firms, acquisition experience is not directly valued by the market. Moreover, 
although reputation is a valuable intangible asset, managers should realize that it could 
work to their disadvantage if they do not have sufficient acquisition experience. However, 
if they are experienced acquirers, reputation would amplify the positive impact of their 
acquisition experience. Finally, although it has been shown that socially responsible firms 
are more respected (Love & Kraatz, 2009), managers of these companies should be aware 
of potential negative consequences when they adopt strategies that are mainly evaluated 
based on their economic success, such as acquisitions. 
Our study is limited in several important ways. First, our study investigated only 
acquisition announcements in 2010. A longitudinal analysis would add to the strength of 
our arguments and results. Second, we tried to include all disclosed and undisclosed 
acquisitions in 2010. Therefore, we lost the flexibility to control for some deal 
characteristics such as payment method as well as some target company characteristics 
such as target size and profitability prior to an acquisition. Third, our sample includes 
only the largest companies with established reputations. There is an opportunity for 
future research to examine the importance of intangible assets for smaller firms. Finally, 
our study was limited only to the US market’s reaction to acquisition announcements. 
However, markets in other countries might show different reactions. Particularly, the U.S. 
is known as a more shareholder-centered country (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Therefore, 
it would be interesting to test the arguments of this study in more stakeholder-centered 
countries. 
122 
To conclude, this study contributes to the strategy literature by demonstrating the 
effect of intangible assets on strategic actions and organizational outcomes. Analyzing 
296 acquisition announcements in 2010, we found that acquirer acquisition experience 
has a U-shaped relationship with market evaluation of acquisition success, while 
reputation and social performance both have negative relationships. Furthermore, we 
demonstrated that reputation magnifies the impact of acquisition experience, making it 
more negative for novice acquirers and more positive for expert ones. By doing so, we 
tried to deepen our understanding of the strategic importance of intangible assets. 
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